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Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to free-
dom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The eavesdropper, like Dickens' Artful Dodger 2, is a figure
much maligned and much envied in society. Part technologist and
part voyeur, the eavesdropper fulfills one's unstated fantasies of
venturing undetected, if only briefly, into the private lives of
others.3 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the nation increasingly
found itself not the voyeur but the victim of electronic surveillance.
As a result of the numerous scandals 4 and hearings5 of that period,
* The Author would like to thank Kirsten Engel and Jon Waltz for their helpful
suggestions and encouragement during the researching and writing of this Article. The
Author, however, is solely responsible for the theories contained in this Article.
* * Federal Judicial Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1987; B.A., University of Chicago, 1983.
1Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 C. DICKENS, OLIVER TwiST (R. Garland ed. 1984).
3 Social scientists have discovered a relationship between increasingly sophisticated
surveillance devices and a rise in individual cases of voyeurism. Yalom, Aggression and
Forbiddeness in Voyeurism, in 3 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 305 (1960). See also
Rovere, The Invasion of Privacy (1): Technology and the Claims of Community, 27 AM. SCHOLAR
413, 416 (1985)("[while] [t]here is a hermit spirit in each of us . . . [there is] also a
snooper, a census taker, a gossipmonger and a brother's keeper.").
4 During the 1960s and 197 0s, the press reported widespread governmental surveil-
lance, including the Army's surveillance of various political figures, such as Edward Ken-
nedy, George McGovern, and various state officials. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1972,
at A4, col. 1. Victims of surveillance ranged from a Supreme Court Justice to the Los
Angeles Chamber of Commerce. Williamson v. United States, 405 U.S. 1026, 1028
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such exotic devices as "shot-gun mikes," 6 radioactive "tagging,"'7
and "laser window pick-ups" became public knowledge for the first
(1972)(Douglas, J., dissenting); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SURVEILLANCE:
HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW 21 (1985) [hereinafter HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW]. Newspa-
pers were also filled with stories of international espionage in which the government
itself was the victim, including the highly embarassing revelations that a Soviet bug was
uncovered in the Great Seal of the United States, a gift from the Soviets which had hung
over the desk of the United States Ambassador for a number of years. NATIONAL WIRE-
TAPPING COMMISSION, COMMISSION STUDIES, SUPPORTING MATERIALS FOR THE REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 177 (1976)[hereinafter NWC COMMISSION
STUDIES].
5 See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RE-
SPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, WARRANTLESS FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, S.
REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 271 (Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports, Book
III, Final Report 1976); Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaty, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965);
Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1-5 (1959); Wire-
tapping: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 53 (1955). See also Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 64 (9th Cir. 1973)("The Govern-
ment's uninvited ears and eyes have conjoined its cybernatic memory to compile hun-
dreds of dossiers on high political figures, domestic . . .programs . . .and average
citizens.").
6 The "shot-gun mike" derives its name from the series of interfitting tubes ex-
tending several feet, usually from atop a tripod, that causes the mike to resemble a rifle.
The device can focus its receiving power on a very selective target (within 300 feet)
enabling the operator to listen to a single conversation amidst a crowded room or a
noisy street. NWC COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 4, at 171-72. See also INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, AUDIO SURVEILLANCE AND COUNTERMEASURES 10
(1973) (describing complex surveillance devices); Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1966).
7 The Soviets use this method to follow a target at considerable distances while in-
suring easy detection should the target allude the actual "tailing" agents. In the past,
the Soviets have used a low-grade radioactive substance to "tag" a target, allowing
agents to follow the individual with a device similar to a Geiger counter. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 29, 1985, at A4, col. 2. Recent accounts of the "dusting" of United States diplo-
mats and their families in Moscow with a chemical material called ni-
trophenylpentadienal, illustrates the continued use of this method of surveillance. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at Al, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1985, at A4, col. 2. See also
Westin, supra note 6, at 1005 (describing early uses of fluorescent dyes and radioactive
substances by police in the 1950s). Both radioactive and chemical "tagging" give the
KGB the added benefit of detecting individuals who have come into contact with the
target by simply looking for radioactive or chemical residue in their homes or on their
bodies.
8 This device is used to listen to conversations conducted within a closed room
which cannot be penetrated to plant a bug without detection. The laser window pick-up
directs a continual laser beam onto a windowpane and picks up the conversation from
the vibrations of the glass. NWC COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 4, at 181. A "spike
mike" is used more often than the "laser window pick-up." The "spike mike" is oper-
ated by simply placing a metal rod against any conventional heating or ventilation duct.
The duct then becomes a giant listening tube from which conversations several floors
above are monitored effectively. Westin, supra note 6, at 1007. Nevertheless, the most
commonly used form of surveillance today is the telephone wiretap which, in 1986, ac-
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time.9 The result was public outcry for greater restrictions on police
surveillance' 0 to protect what Justice Brandeis once referred to as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civ-
ilized men," the right to be left alone."
In 1968, Congress enacted title III of the Omnibus Crime and
Control Act, a national regulation controlling the use of electronic
surveillance by private and governmental parties.12 The purpose of
the Act was two-fold: to enable law enforcement agencies to use
electronic surveillance to combat organized crime and to create a
rigid system of safeguards to protect individual privacy.' 3 Recogniz-
ing the natural tension between those goals, Congress sought to in-
sure individual privacy through a minimum federal standard.
Applicable also to the states, this minimum standard codified vari-
ous constitutional protections found wanting by the Supreme Court
in previous state and federal regulations. 14
Congress imposed the minimum federal standard on the states
through a condition on state privacy statutes enacted under the Act.
Congress authorized the states to experiment with their own privacy
standards on the condition that those standards be as stringent as
the federal model. 5 States borrowed from title III in varying de-
counted for seventy-nine percent of all surveillance operations. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE
INTERCEPTIONS OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS 16-17 (table 6)(1986)[hereinafter
U.S. COURTS REPORT (1986)]. Microphones are the second most common form of sur-
veillance. Id.
9 This is not to say that the early years of surveillance technology were scandal-free.
One of the greatest surveillance scandals occurred as a result of the infamous Palmer
raids against aliens in which the government employed indiscriminate wiretappings.
HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 4.
10 See, e.g., Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965); HISTORICAL
POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4 at 3. See also Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 63 (9th Cir.
1973) ("Public fear of omnipresent electronic surveillance has escalated with increasing
revelations of widespread wiretapping, bugging, monitoring, and recording.").
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-
04, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) and 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
13 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2177. See also Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law
of Electronic Surveillance, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1983). Goldsmith stated:
[W]hile it has been suggested that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 was enacted "[t]o guard against the realization of Orwellian
fears and conform to the constitutional standards for electronic surveillance," the
statute can better be characterized as a conscious compromise forged by Congess
between competing privacy and law enforcement concerns.
Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir. 1976)).
14 See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
15 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 98, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN.
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grees, with some states incorporating the federal language virtually
in toto16 and others incorporating only individual sections. 17 Some
states, however, went far beyond the federal model and either cur-
tailed sharply or barred outright the use of electronic surveillance. ' 8
NEws at 2187 ("[The Act] envisions that states would be free to adopt more restrictive
legislation, or no legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation.").
16 At present, forty-six states and the District of Columbia have statutes regulating
electronic surveillance. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30 to 37 (1975); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 42.20.3.00-.340 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3004 to 3014 (1978 & Supp.
1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-17-107 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.2 (West 1970
& Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-15-101 to 104 (1986 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187 to 189 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336
(1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to 556 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01-.10 (West
1985 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 to 3010 (1983); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-
41 to 49 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to 6709 (1987 & Supp. 1987);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14-1 to 14-6 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 727.8 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to 2519 (1981 & Supp. 1987);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010-.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:1301 to 1312 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 709-712
(1980 & Supp. 1987); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to 412 (1984 &
Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.539-.540 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.A.01-.23
(West 1983 & Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-25-53 (1972 & Supp. 1987); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to 712 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 179.410-.515 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:I to A:Il (1986 &
Supp. 1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-l to 26 (West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-
12-1 to 11 (1984); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-158 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 8-10-07.2 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4931.28 (Baldwin 1978 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 176.1-.14
(West 1983 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721 to .739 (1987); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 12-5.1-1 to
16 (1981 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 23A-35A-1 to 21 (Supp. 1987);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-1324 (1982); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 18.20 (Vernon
Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to 11 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-61 to
70 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030 to .090 (1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 62-10-1
to 16 (Supp. 1988); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-3-
601 to 610 (1987).
17 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3004 to 3014 (1978 & Supp. 1987); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 to 3010 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.A.01-.23 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
18 The surveillance statutes of fifteen states do not authorize electronic surveillance.
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-30 to 37 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.20.3.00-.340 (1983); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 23-17-107 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.2 (West 1970 & Supp.
1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14-1 to 14-6 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1988); IoWA
CODE ANN. § 727. 8 (West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010-.080 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 709-712 (1980 & Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 750.539-.540 (West 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-25-53 (1972 & Supp.
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-158 (1986); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 8-10-07.2 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4931.28 (Baldwin 1978 &
Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-1324 (1982). Two of these states retain statutes
that prohibit electronic eavesdropping. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-17-107 (1987); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 8-10-07.2 (1987). SeeJ. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 1-17 (2d
ed. 1986)(these "archaic statutes" are largely ineffectual). Four states have no law gov-
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Variant state and federal standards have led to serious conflicts
between state and federal courts over the use of illegally gathered
state evidence in federal prosecutions. Most federal circuits follow a
rule that evidence gathered illegally under a state privacy law is nev-
ertheless admissible in federal court if the evidence satisfies the min-
imum federal standard.' 9 Increasingly, however, a number of courts
have challenged this "majority rule" and have construed title III as
incorporating the more stringent state standards into the federal
standard of admissibility, thereby making a violation of a state pri-
vacy law by state agents a collateral violation of title III as well.20
Under this "minority rule," adopted in the Second, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, federal courts must apply state standards to de-
termine the admissibility of any evidence gathered by state agents.
under a more stringent state privacy law.2 1
The minority rule courts, however, limit the scope of this rule
in one significant way: evidence gathered from surveillance con-
ducted with the consent of one party to a conversation is governed
by federal, not state, law. 22 This consensual exception is based on
language in title III that expressly exempts federal agents from the
provisions and procedures of the Act if they have "one-party" con-
sent.23 Conversely, title III requires federal agents to secure court
orders when they cannot obtain the consent of one of the parties to
a monitored conversation. 24 Any "nonconsensual" surveillance that
occurs without a court order is expressly made inadmissible under
the Act's suppression provision 25 and can provide grounds for civil
suits by injured parties.26 Consent, therefore, becomes a critical
erning state law enforcement agent activities in areas of surveillance, even though the
current federal legislation effectively bars states without such laws from conducting elec-
tronic surveillance. These states are Indiana, Missouri, South Carolina, and Vermont.
19 For a list of cases employing the majority rule including past cases from the Sec-
ond, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits before those circuits adopted the minority rule, see
Note, United States v. McNulty: Title III and the Admissibility of Illegally Gathered State Evi-
dence, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1714, 1724-45 n.80 (1986)[hereinafter Title III and Admissibility].
20 See, e.g., United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
21 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1717 n.13.
22 See, e.g., McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1266 ("Where one party consented and no state
court order or warrant was obtained.., the requirement.., that the applicable state law
must be complied with, does not come into play.").
23 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (Supp. IV 1986)("It shall not be unlawful under this chap-
ter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic commu-
nication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception.").
24 Id. at § 2516.
25 Id. at § 2518(10)(a)(i).
26 Id. at § 2520(c)(2). Title III's civil damages section was amended in 1986 to differ-
[Vol. 79
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threshold test for admissibility of federal evidence in federal courts.
Minority rule courts assert that, because title III expressly states
that it does not make warrantless consensual surveillance unlawful,
consensual surveillance as a whole does not come under the Act's
various provisions and sanctions.27 Thus, the Act's suppression
provision and, more generally, its incorporation of more stringent
state standards apply only to nonconsensual surveillance.
The minority rule's consensual distinction seriously under-
mines a number of state privacy laws that require consent by all par-
ties to a monitored conversation before a state can conduct a
warrantless surveillance. In these "all-party" states,28 it is possible
for state agents to gather evidence unlawfully, without a court order,
and then to turn over their ill-gotten gains to federal counterparts
for prosecution under the lower federal standards. In a number of
cases, consensual surveillance evidence suppressed in state courts
entiate between types of commission transmissions. Congress, however, also signifi-
candy raised potential damages under the Act. The new section provides:
[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, dis-
closed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover
from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be
appropriate....
(2)[T]he court may assess as damages whichever is the greater of-
(A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits
made by the violator as a result of the violation; or
(B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of$100 a day for each day of
violation or $10,000.
Id.
27 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1266 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Nelligan, 573
F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632, 650
(N.D. Ill. 1983); Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1736 n.162.
28 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 14-1 to 14-6 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp.
1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.410-.515 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 570-A; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-1(c) (1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721 to .739
(1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030 to .090 (1988). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 630-637.2 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988)(warrantless consensual surveillance prohibited
except when used by law enforcement agents); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
§ 99(D)(1)(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988)(warrantless consensual surveillance prohibited
except when used to investigate "organized crime"); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33
(West 1985)(warrantless consensual surveillance allowed but not admissible at trial); see
also State v. Parisi, 181 NJ. Super. 117, 436 A.2d 948 (1981)(requiring oral or written
authorization for consensual surveillance in New Jersey); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872
(Alaska 1978)(interpreting Alaska constitution as prohibiting warrantless consensual
surveillance, even though Alaska has a consensual exception similar to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(c) as part of its surveillance statute). In Montana, a warrant is apparently re-
quired for face-to-face consensual surveillance or videotaping but not telephone surveil-
lance. See e.g, State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978)(face-to-face
surveillance); State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984)(videotaping); State v. Canon,
687 P.2d 705 (Mont. 1984)(telephone surveillance). Similarly, Oregon allows warrant-
less consensual surveillance of telephone conversations but not of face-to-face conversa-
tions. OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540(1)(a) and (c) (1987).
1988]
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has been "recycled" for use in federal courts in open defiance of
state privacy standards. 29 Moreover, given the wider use of consen-
sual surveillance, the consensual distinction opens a large gap in the
Act's privacy protections through which a potentially high amount
of suppressed or suppressable state evidence can pass into federal
court.
30
This Article contests the logic of excluding consensual surveil-
lance from the minority rule. The argument in favor of this exten-
sion will be based on both statutory and policy grounds. It will be
shown that many of the statutory arguments used by the minority
rule courts to defeat the majority rule's blanket rejection of state
standards are equally applicable and persuasive in the consensual
context. It will be further argued that minority rule courts have
failed to present a justifiable alternative to the incorporation of state
consensual laws. This Article argues that the past justifications for
the minority rule's consensual distinction are unsupportable on a
theoretical level and present serious problems of federal preemp-
tion and police forum shopping.
This Article first provides a brief background of consensual sur-
veillance and the consensual distinction. 31 After showing how the
consensual distinction developed in early legal doctrine and how it
was finally codified in title 111,32 this Article discusses the majority
and minority rules.33 By examining the arguments used by minority
29 See, e.g., United States v. Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v.
Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983). See also United States v. Daniel, 667 F.2d 783
(9th Cir. 1982)(evidence unlawfully gathered by state agent for federal prosecution),
and United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1371 (3d Cir. 1975)(evidence unlawfully
gathered by state agent for federal prosecution). Cf. United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d
1243, 1266 (10th Cir. 1984)(re-use of state suppressed nonconsensual surveillance evi-
dence in federal court).
30 Because no formal reporting requirement for state consensual surveillance exists,
gauging the rough number of state consensual operations conducted annually is diffi-
cult. It is generally believed that consensual surveillance, which is free of procedural
and legal restrictions, is used far more frequently than nonconsensual surveillance. This
belief is borne out in the few reports containing statistics on consensual surveillance.
For example, federal authorities conducted a total of 957 nonconsensual surveillance
operations from 1968 to 1974. NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMMISSION, ELECTRONIC SUR-
VEILLANCE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEW OF FEDERAL AND
STATE LAws RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 43 (table 1)
(1976) [hereinafter NWC REPORT]. During the same period, federal authorities con-
ducted 4103 consensual surveillance operations. Id. This figure is based on internal
Justice Department figures for requests made for consensual surveillance under a de-
partmental rule requiring advance approval of consensual operations. Id.
31 See infra notes 40-90 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 69-109 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 122-74 and accompanying text.
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rule courts to refute the majority rule,3 4 this Article shows that many
of these arguments can be used to refute the consensual distinction.
Following a discussion of the statutory and policy arguments chal-
lenging the consensual distinction, this Article suggests an expan-
sion of the minority rule to apply state law in cases in which state
officers violate state consensual standards.3 5 This Article then con-
siders the alternative interpretation suggested by minority rule
courts.3 6 Because the statutory basis of the minority rule's consen-
sual distinction remains unclear,3 7 this Article will consider the two
possible interpretations of the consensual provision that would ex-
plain the result reached by the minority rule courts. It will be shown
that neither of these interpretations can be sustained under current
Supreme Court doctrine and that one of the interpretations actually
results in the application, not the exclusion, of state law.3 8 Finally,
this Article will present a series of legislative proposals that would
more clearly mandate the application in federal court of more strin-
gent state standards, nonconsensual and consensual, under title
III.39
II. BACKGROUND OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND THE
EVOLUTION OF THE CONSENSUAL DISTINCTION
A. CONSENSUAL SURVEILLANCE: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ROOTS
Ancient history is rife with tales of the cunning uses of eaves-
dropping by rulers and rebels alike.40 In the hills of Syracuse, Sicily,
a large man-made cave remains as a testament to man's preoccupa-
tion with knowing the secrets of his neighbor. This S-shaped cave,
called the "Ear of Dionysius," was designed to enable the rulers of
ancient Syracuse to overhear the whispers of their captives. 4 1 In
34 See infra notes 143-70 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 205-62 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 263-317 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 263-318 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 319-51 and accompanying text.
40 For a brief history of electronic surveillance, seeJ. CARR, supra note 18, at 1-1 to 2-
3; HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 1-33; NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 33-
40; Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 165 (1952).
41 This type of surveillance would be considered "strategic intelligence surveil-
lance," that is, indiscriminate surveillance intended to gather any and all intelligence
that might be useful. This type of surveillance is expressly prohibited in title III.
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For an extreme example of
indiscriminate survelliance in which police seized the entire contents of a house for the
purpose of sifting through it at a police station to uncover anything incriminating, see
Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
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modern-day parlance, such eavesdropping is called "nonconsen-
sual" because, presumably, none of the captives gave their consent
to the monitoring.42 If one of the Syracusian captives turned collab-
orator and initiated a conversation to incriminate his colleagues,
however, the monitoring would then be "consensual," because the
collaborator, as one of the parties to the conversation, would have
consented to having his conversation overheard.43
Early uses of electronic surveillance in America were predomi-
nantly nonconsensual. 44 During the Civil War, wiretappers uncov-
ered the plans and troop movements of the enemy by "splicing"
recently laid telegraph wires. 45 These military wiretappers46 turned
professional after the war and plied their trade in more profitable
pursuits with scandalous results. 47
The first regulations on wiretapping were state laws designed to
place some restrictions on these early practitioners.48 Like their
42 For a short historical look at eavesdropping as a science, see NWC REPORT, supra
note 30, at 33-40. For other studies of consensual surveillance, see generally J. CARR,
supra note 18; Fishman, The Interception of Communications without a Court Order: Title III,
Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41 (1976); Comment, Does The
"One-Party Consent" Exception Effectuate the Underlying Goals of Title III?, 18 AKRON L. REV.
495 (1985). For a more technical discussion of electronic surveillance, see Horgan,
Thwarting the Information Thieves, IEEE SPECTRUM, July 1985, at 30-41.
43 The overhearing of the Syracusian captives might today be covered by title III,
because the "Ear of Dionysius" was technically a listening device, albeit a very large one.
The distinction between an "overhearing" and a "monitoring" became quite important
following the enactment of title III. An "interception," which the Act defines as requir-
ing the use of an "electronic, mechanical or other device," triggers the provisions of title
III. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), (5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Consequently, an unaided over-
hearing does not qualify as an interception today. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 90,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2178. Under the Act's definition of
"electronic, mechanical, or other device," 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the
"Ear of Dionysius" might qualify as one of those "other device[s]" covered by the Act.
44 See generally J. CARR, supra note 18, at 3-55 to 3-93; Comment, supra note 42 at 496.
45 NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 33. Although military wiretappers functioned on a
limited basis in Europe, the American Civil War represented the first application of mili-
tary wiretapping on a large scale.
46 The most accurate figures place the number of trained wiretappers in the Civil
War at less than 200. The figures are difficult to gauge, however, because some Civil
War commanders trained their own wiretappers. One commander, General J.E.B. Stu-
art, even had a professional wiretapper on his personal staff. NWC REPORT, supra note
30, at 33. See also S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, EAVESDROPPERS 23 (1959).
47 S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, supra note 46, at 23 ("A correspondent for
a Boston evening newspaper who had been an expert Civil War telegrapher was exposed
as a wiretapper .... [revealing] that he would often save himself the trouble of news-
gathering by listening to the dispatches of other correspondents as they were sent over
the wires."). See also NWC REPORT, supra note 30.
48 Other restrictions came in the form of agency rules. For example, in 1924, Attor-
ney General Harlan Fiske Stone, a staunch critic of electronic surveillance, banned all
use of the technique by the FBI's forerunner, the Bureau of Investigation. HISTORICAL
POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 4. Electronic surveillance was later included in the Bu-
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successors, these early laws left consensual surveillance and record-
ing entirely free from regulation. 49 Generally, however, state laws
prohibiting or regulating nonconsensual surveillance were largely
ineffectual.5 0 Although twenty-eight states had made wiretapping a
crime by 1927, the eavesdropping industry, like much else in the
industrial revolution, flourished.51 During this period, the law pro-
vided few substantive protections for citizens beyond the common
law, which treated eavesdropping as nothing more than a
nuisance.52
Consensual surveillance in these early years caused little con-
cern among the legislatures, courts, or the public at large.5  While
critics often denounced nonconsensual surveillance as invasive and
unseemly, 54 consensual surveillance was generally viewed as simply
reau's Manual as one of the enumerated "Unethical Tactics." Id. See also SENATE SELECT
COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcTIVI-
TIES, WARRANTLESS FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 271 (Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports, Book III, Final Report 1976).
49 S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, supra note 46, at 23. Ironically, these reg-
ulations were written in response to abuses by one of the most persistent critics of elec-
tronic surveillance, the press. Id. One of the early statutes prohibiting electronic
eavesdropping, passed in 1905 in California, followed a highly publicized newspaper
scandal involving the San Francisco Examiner's tapping of a competing newspaper's
communications. Id. at 25. Wiretappers trained during the Civil War found eager em-
ployers in the press as newspapers competed for "scoops" by tapping each other's com-
munications and pilfering each other's stories. Id. at 23. See also Westin, supra note 40,
at 172 n.35.
50 See NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 35. See also S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWL-
TON, supra note 46, at 30.
51 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBER-
TIES 31 (1985) [hereinafter OTA REPORT ]. See also HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra
note 4, at 3.
52 Katz V. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967)(Black, J., dissent-
ing) (Eavesdropping was an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a
nuisance.).
53 Interestingly, public reaction to early uses of eavesdropping was probably more
ambivalent than the critical comments of popular historical figures might suggest. NWC
REPORT, supra note 30, at 34-35; Westin, supra note 40, at 166; OTA REPORT, supra note
51, at 32. See also Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 5-6 (society's acquiescence toward elec-
tronic surveillance may "reflect an overall satisfaction with the utilitarian compromise
between crime control and privacy rights that Title III sought to achieve, but it also
might be attributable to fatigue after years of debate"); NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at
35 ("[I]n 1933, legislation was passed, but it banned only the use of wiretap evidence in
prosecutions under the Prohibition laws, which themselves were abandoned that same
year.").
54 This negative view of eavesdropping and eavesdroppers stems in part from strong
cultural attitudes regarding the use of any form of surreptitious surveillance:
mhe least admirable of the groups of creatures that qualify for membership in the
human race ... moving by stealth and secrecy . . [spending] so much time in
manholes, cellars and other hideouts that would be frightened by the noonday sun.
They violate every sacred relation established by God and protected by law; hus-
band and wife; parent and child; minister and parishioner; doctor and patient; law-
1988]
JONATHAN TURLEY
a part of an individual's right to repeat a conversation as a partici-
pant to a conversation. 55 Courts even analogized the danger posed
by electronic surveillance to the danger posed by an unreliable
friend with a perfect memory.56 Thus, courts viewed the difference
created by the new surveillance technology as one of degree of com-
pleteness present in electronically versus orally reproduced state-
ments. 57  Accordingly, courts welcomed the development of
consensual surveillance technology as a protection against, rather
than a vehicle of, police abuse. Before the advent of this technol-
ogy, courts often relied on the sometimes questionable memory and
veracity of the police informers who participated in critical conver-
sations. 58 Consensual surveillance technology, particularly record-
yer and client. . . It is a patent fact that the wiretapper invades privacy more
outrageously and procures more detailed information on people's intimate affairs
than could an intruder making an unlawful search and seizure.
Fly, Wiretapping Outrage, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1950, at 14 (article by former Chairman
of the Federal Communications Commission). See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 466 (1963)(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[M]ost of us would still agree that [electronic
surveillance] is an unsavory practice."); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470
(1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting) (characterizing electronic surveillance as a "dirty
business").
55 In Rathbun v. United States, an early consensual surveillance case, the Supreme
Court incorporated this view as part of its decision upholding the use of warrantless
consensual surveillance. 355 U.S. 107 (1957). The Court stated that "[w]e need not say
that a man may never make a record of what he hears on the telephone by having some-
one else listen ... as in the case at bar, even by allowing him to interpose a recording
machine. The receiver may certainly himself broadcast the message as he pleases ...."
Id. at 110 n.7 (quoting United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 889). Later, in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971), the Court reaffirmed this point: "For constitu-
tional purposes, no different result is required if the [undercover] agent instead of im-
mediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1)
simultaneously records them ... (2) or ... simultaneously transmits [them]."
56 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967)(defendant takes the risk
that "his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later verbatim repetitions, is instead
recording it or transmitting it to another."); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439
(1963)("We think the risk that petitioner took ... fairly included the risk that the offer
would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical
recording.").
57 The accuracy advantage in electronic monitoring and recording has appealed to
courts considering electronic surveillance evidence. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 753 (1971). The Court in White concluded that an electronic recording will
"many times produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant has said than will
the unaided memory of a police agent." Id. The Court stated that the informant is less
likely to change his or her mind with a recording in existence and, thus, chances are less
that threat or injury will suppress unfavorable evidence. Id. Compare id. with Goldsmith,
supra note 13, at 1 (a Watergate juror, commenting after deliberations, said that "[i]t's
hard to argue with . . . tapes-It's too bad we couldn't have tapes at every
trial.")(quoting ITHACA J., Jan. 2, 1975 at 2, col. 2).
58 This fear of inaccurate or untruthful accounts is clearly evident in the opinions of
jurists like Blackstone, who described eavesdropping as "listen[ing] under walls or win-
dows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slan-
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ing devices, supplied these courts with a reliable and accurate
record of a conversation that was unembellished and unedited by
the memory of a biased witness.
The unregulated status of consensual surveillance was also sup-
ported by a general predilection for holding individuals responsible
for their own statements and actions. Running through many con-
sensual surveillance cases is the notion that, when revealing any-
thing in a conversation with another person, there is always a risk
that the confidence placed in the other person is in fact misplaced.59
Absent coercion or confusion, the law traditionally left it to the indi-
vidual to weigh these risks and rejected any judicial role in protect-
ing the gullible from the unreliable.60
These implicit perceptions of consensual surveillance helped
insulate it from legislative efforts to curb the practice in the 1920s
and 1930s.61 Although congressional concern over the expanding
use of electronic surveillance was increasingly evident during this
period, congressional attention focused entirely on nonconsensual
surveillance. 62 In 1934, Congress passed section 605 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934,63 which was the first major national regu-
lation of electronic surveillance. Although section 605 contained a
sweeping prohibition of wiretapping,64 consensual surveillance re-
derous and mischievious tales . . ." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 168. See also
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1970)(In addition to the higher reliability
afforded by electronic surveillance, "[i]t may also be that with the recording in existence
it is less likely that the informant will change his mind, less chance that threat of injury
will suppress unfavorable evidence and less chance that cross-examination will confound
the testimony.").
59 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967)("When one man speaks to another
he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so doing... The Fourth Amendment does
not protect against unreliable (or law-abiding) associates.").
60 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)(Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)("The risk of being overheard.., or betrayed... is probably inherent in the condi-
tions of human society.").
61 State laws focused predominantly upon nonconsensual surveillance, giving little, if
any, consideration to consensual surveillance. NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 113-17.
These laws were largely ineffectual, however. Part of the problem with these early laws
has been attributed to their requirement that state officers enforce standards that they
were consistently, even notoriously, violating themselves. Title III and Admissibility, supra
note 19, at 1715 ("At the height of police surveillance, New York City police may have
wiretapped as many as 26,000 telephone conversations in a single year.").
62 NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 35.
63 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, § 605, title VI, 48 Stat.
1103 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982 & Supp. III 1985))("No person not being au-
thorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted commu-
nication to any person.").
64 Section 605 ostensibly banned the nonconsensual interception and divulgence of
communications. See supra note 63. The Supreme Court later appeared to reaffirm this
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mained unregulated. Thus, in the 1940s and 1950s, opponents of
consensual surveillance turned to the courts for relief, arguing a
plethora of statutory and constitutional objections to consensual
surveillance.
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of
warrantless consensual surveillance in On Lee v. United States. 65 In
that case, a government informer allowed federal agents to monitor
a series of conversations with his friend, On Lee.66 During these
conversations, On Lee incriminated himself in a conspiracy to sell
opium out of his laundry. 67 Later arrested and convicted on narcot-
ics charges, On Lee appealed on the ground that the use of the elec-
tronic surveillance constituted an unreasonable search and seizure.
Rejecting this fourth amendment argument, the Court noted that
"[s]ociety can ill afford to throw away the evidence produced by the
falling out, jealousies, and quarrels of those who live by outwitting
the law." 68
The consensual distinction was first used by the Court in Rath-
bun v. United States.69 This case involved the use by police of a tele-
phone extension to overhear a death threat made by Rathbun in an
effort to extort a stock certificate from a business associate.7 0 Rath-
bun challenged the use of the telephone extension under section
605 which, he argued, prohibited any interception of a wire or oral
interpretation of the provision in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (Nardone
I) and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)(Nardone II). Yet, despite its abso-
lute language, section 605 was ineffective in curbing wiretapping by federal officers. Nu-
merous factors contributed to this impotence. First and foremost, the section's
seemingly comprehensive wiretapping ban was eroded by ajustice Department interpre-
tation. The language of section 605 prohibited the interception and divulgence of inter-
cepted communications. Accordingly, until 1963, the Justice Department claimed the
perogative to wiretap for investigatory purposes so long as it did not divulge the ac-
quired information outside the Department. NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 3. See also
S. REP. No. 2700, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1950)(congressional oversight committee
described this interpretation as "strained and over-technical."). Supreme Court deci-
sions narrowly construing its operative language reduced the efficacy of section 605 in
curbing illegal wiretapping. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 13-32 (imposing tougher
standing requirements and limiting the law to the federal courts); Schwartz v. Texas, 344
U.S. 199 (1952)(interceptions by state officials are not prohibited by section 605 and can
be admitted as evidence in state prosecutions).
65 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Although On Lee was one of the Court's earliest considera-
tions of warrantless consensual surveillance, the holding in the case was narrowly tai-
lored to section 605. The Court held that section 605 did not bar the use of such
surveillance because the Act only governed conversations sent over communications
systems. Id. at 754.
66 Id. at 749.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 756.
69 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
70 Id. at 107-08.
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communication. While recognizing that section 605 barred unau-
thorized interceptions, the Court distinguished conversations over-
heard with the consent of one of the participants from those
overheard without such consent. The Court stated that it would be
strange for Congress to prohibit third-party consensual surveillance
when it is clear that either party to the conversation could record
and publish the conversation2 1 "The conduct of the [publishing]
party," the Court concluded, "would differ in no way if instead of
repeating the message he held out his handset so that another could
hear out of it."72 The Court stressed various policy and practical
reasons for distinguishing between consensual and nonconsensual
surveillance. First, to do otherwise, the Court noted, would allow
one party to force another into secrecy merely by using a tele-
phone. 73 Second, the Court stated that "common experience"
makes any expectation of privacy unreasonable when one uses a tel-
ephone. 74 "Each party to a telephone.. . " the Court concluded,
"takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone
and may allow another to overhear the conversation. ' 7 5
The consensual distinction inaugurated by Rathbun outlasted
section 605 and was gradually expanded to include not just
overhearings and recordings but all forms of electronic surveil-
lance.76 In later cases, the Court repeatedly rejected fourth amend-
71 Id. at 110-11.
72 Id. It is interesting to note that this emphasis on telephonic communication is
stressed in some states which allow warrantless consensual surveillance of telephone
conversations, but not face-to-face oral conversations. Compare State v. Brackman, 178
Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978)(warrant required for consensual surveillance of face-
to-face conversation) with State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984)(no warrant required
for consensual surveillance of telephonic conversation). Also, it is interesting to com-
pare OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(1)(a) (1987), which allows one-party consent for
surveillance of telephonic conversations, with OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(l)(c)
(1987), which requires all-party consent for surveillance of oral communications.
73 355 U.S. at 110 ("[O]ne party may not force the other to secrecy merely by using a
telephone."). Although the Court wished to keep "one party [from] forc[ing] the other
into secrecy merely by using a telephone," id., it is ironic that in a number of states it is
possible to do so by not using a telephone. See supra note 72.
74 355 U.S. at 111.
75 Id. at 111.
76 See infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of warrantless
consensual surveillance was generally assumed after United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971). See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963)(reaffirming Rath-
bun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957)). In White, the Court held, in a plurality deci-
sion, that the use of a transmitter to record a conversation with the consent of a
government informer did not violate the fourth amendment. The Court stressed that
recordings, like oral renditions by a participant, are a natural risk that one assumes in
engaging in any conversation.
For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the [undercover] agent
instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant,
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ment arguments that consensual surveillance amounted to an
unreasonable search and seizure77 or that it violated the noncon-
senting party's right to privacy. 78 The distinction, therefore, was
heavily ensconced in Supreme Court precedent, when, in 1967, the
Court embarked upon a thorough reevaluation of the constitutional-
ity of electronic surveillance.
In two 1967 watershed cases, the Supreme Court rewrote the
constitutional guidelines for the use of electronic surveillance. In
the first case, Berger v. New York, the Court held a state surveillance
statute unconstitutional because it failed to contain certain fourth
amendment protections of individual privacy. 79 In the second case,
Katz v. United States, the Court dispensed with its previous trespass-
based test for unreasonable searches and seizures and adopted a
new approach that would protect people, not just places.80
Although both of these cases involved nonconsensual surveillance,
they would have a pronounced effect on consensual surveillance. In
Berger, the Court specified the various constitutional deficiencies
that it found in the New York electronic surveillance statute.81 Ber-
either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carry-
ing on his person, Lopez v. United States... (2) or carries radio equipment which
simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located
elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. On Lee v.
United States ... If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without elec-
tronic equipment do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expecta-
tions of privacy, neither does a simultaneously recording of the same conversations
made by the agent or others from transmissions received from the agent to whom
the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.
White, 401 U.S. at 751 (plurality opinion). But,cf. United States v. Kline, 366 F. Supp.
994, 996 (D.D.C. 1973)(White places "an enormously dangerous and insidious power...
in the unsupervised hands of the public and the police."). See alsoJ. CARR, supra note 18,
at 3-59 (courts have generally reacted negatively to White and have used its plurality
status to circumvent its holding); Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amend-
ment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1981)(arguing for
a more liberal reading of White).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
78 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); see generally Walinski &
Tucker, supra note 76.
79 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
80 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81 The Berger Court listed eight deficiencies in the New York statute that would need
to be corrected before the statute would comply with the fourth amendment. Berger, 388
U.S. at 51-60. The Court's guidelines for a constitutional violation were subsequently
described in a Senate report as containing the following:
I. Particularity in describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized.
2. Particularity in describing the crime that has been, is being, or is about to be
committed.
3. Particularity in describing the type of conversation sought.
4. Limitations on the officer executing the eavesdrop order which would:
a) prevent his searching unauthorized areas, and
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ger gave Congress both a framework for future legislation and an
indication that such legislation, if carefully crafted, would weather a
fourth amendment attack.8 2 Notably missing from that framework,
however, was any warrant or administrative procedure directly relat-
ing to consensual surveillance.
The absence of consensual surveillance protections in Berger's
legislative guidelines suggested that any future legislation need not
include such protections to be constitutional. That conclusion was
given implicit support in Katz v. United States.8 3 Handed down six
months after Berger, Katz represents the final rejection of the tres-
pass doctrine, which had been the Court's fourth amendment test
for thirty-nine years.84 Under the trespass doctrine, the police could
use any manner of electronic surveillance as long as there was no
actual physical trespass on the suspect's property.8 5 In Katz, a bug
b) prevent further searching once the property sought is found.
5. Probable cause in seeking to renew the eavesdrop order.
6. Dispatch in executing the eavesdrop order.
7. Requirement that executing officer makes return on the eavesdrop order show-
ing what was seized.
8. A showing of exigent circumstances in order to overcome the defect of not giv-
ing prior notice.
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 74, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 2161-62. Berger involved a series of"bugs" used by state officials in their investigation
of an alleged conspiracy to corrupt the New York Liquor Authority. In striking down
New York's surveillance statute, N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813 (1881), repealed by N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988), as permitting illegal
fourth amendment searches, the Court stressed New York's failure to adapt its regula-
tion to new, more intrusive surveillance devices. "The law," the Court stated, "though
jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with these advances in scientific knowl-
edge." Berger, 388 U.S. at 49.
82 NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 38.
83 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
84 The trespass doctrine was established in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928). After ruling that only a physical trespass could trigger the fourth amendment
prohibition of unreasonable,search and seizure, a series of cases paraded through the
courts and presented smaller and smaller physical intrusions in a defendant's property.
The absurdity of the distinction was illustrated by Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158
(1964), in which the Court pondered whether the penetration of a listening device by no
more than a thumbtack was indeed a trespass. Compare Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961)(penetration of listening device into a person's room violates fourth
amendment) with Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)(the dectecaphone, a
device which is placed against a wall much like a glass in order to hear conversation on
the other side, does not violate fourth amendment). It is interesting to note that the
race between surveillance technology and the law apparently continues today. See infra
notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
85 In Olmstead, which established the trespass doctrine, the Court actually encouraged
Congress to pass legislation if the result produced by the trespass doctrine was unpopu-
lar. 277 U.S. at 465-66 ("Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone
messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal crimi-
nal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence.").
Seven separate bills were proposed in Congress to overturn Olmstead. Goldsmith, supra
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was carefully placed on the exterior of a public telephone booth, so
as to avoid a physical intrusion. Brushing aside this fine distinction,
the Court held that the bug was an unreasonable search because
Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the phone.8 6
Although the reasonable expectation test was clearly an ad-
vance from the archaic trespass doctrine, its practical impact was to
further legitimize warrantless consensual surveillance in cases after
Berger and Katz. When taken in context with the Court's earlier con-
sensual surveillance rulings, the Katz test served as something of an
endorsement, albeit implicit, of warrantless consensual surveil-
lance.8 7 In Rathbun and other earlier cases, the Court had already
concluded that it was unreasonable for anyone to presume that an-
other party to a conversation would never record or otherwise re-
veal a conversation's contents.88 Thus, the reasonable expectation
test dovetailed perfectly with these previous consensual surveillance
holdings to effectively block most potential fourth amendment chal-
lenges to consensual surveillance.
The real importance of Berger and Katz, however, was more leg-
islative than judicial. In the summer of 1967, congressional commit-
tees were already working on new electronic surveillance
legislation.8 9 It was clear from the Court's granting of certiorari
that the guidelines established in these cases would ultimately be
incorporated into the new legislation. In Berger and Katz, the Court
mapped out the minimum constitutional protections required of any
future legislation, a constitutional prospectus that did not include
consensual surveillance protections. Congress quickly translated
this prospectus into statutory form and, only seven months after the
Katz decision, enacted the successor to the Federal Communication
Act-title III. 90
note 13, at 11 n.48. The final result was section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, § 605, title VI, 48 Stat. 1103 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)), which courts and administrations later undermined by various
interpretations of its language. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
86 In rejecting the trespass doctrine, the Court in Katz stated that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See generally Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385 (1974).
87 For a good discussion of the reasonable expectations test, see Goldsmith, supra
note 13, at 29-32.
88 See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
89 A presidential commission lobbying for the adoption of a comprehensive surveil-
lance statute specifically stipulated that such legislation should await the guidance of the
Berger and Katz decisions. NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 38-40.
90 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-
804, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) and 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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III. THE STATUTE
On June 19, 1968, title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act was enacted into law. Heralded as Congress' most
comprehensive and daring effort in the field of electronic surveil-
lance,9' title III purported to accomplish two principal objectives:
to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications and to codify
the circumstances and conditions for the authorized interception of
oral and wire communications, as required by Berger and Katz.92
Prior to its enactment, title III received wide bipartisan support.9 3
Although the CoSt, 94 effectiveness, 95 and privacy implications 96 of
91 NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 189. Title III, albeit the most inclusive, is actually
one of seven statutes regulating different aspects of electronic surveillance. OTA RE-
PORT, supra note 51, at 25-26. Among them are title III's two sister statutes, section 705
of the Communications Act of 1934 and the Foreign Surveillance Act of 1978.
Section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934 arose from an amendment of the
Communications Act. After tide III's enactment, section 605 was amended to cover only
radio communications. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705(a), 47
U.S.C. § 605 (Supp III 1985) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 705(a)). This amended provi-
sion, designated section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, provides that "[n]o
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and
divulge... such intercepted communication to any person." Id.
Title III's foreign surveillance counterpart, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, regulates the collection and disclosure of foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence within the United States borders. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (1982
& Supp. III 1985)).
92 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 66. See also NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 42;
NWC COMMISSION STUDIES, supra note 4, at 5.
93 Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 37. See also NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMMISSION
STUDIES, SUPPORTING MATERIALS FOR THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
THE REvIEW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE LAW RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCES 109 (1976) [hereinafter NWC COMMISSION HEARINGS].
94 The costs of electronic surveillance have grown at a remarkable rate since the Act's
enactment. In 1968, the year title III was enacted, the average cost of a federal inter-
cept, or eavesdropping operation, was $1358. NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 268 (table
F-4B). By 1986, the average cost had risen to $62,975. U.S. COURTS REPORT (1986),
supra note 8, at 15 (table 5); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTIONS OF WIRE OR
ORAL COMMUNICATIONS 21 (table 7) (1984) [hereinafter U.S. COURTS REPORT
(1984)]($8087 was the average cost in 1974); Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 160-61 n.957
(electronic surveillance is both highly expensive and labor intensive). See also HISTORI-
CAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 38 (federal government spent at least $13,000,000
on electronic surveillance in 1983 alone).
95 Because the circumstances surrounding each intercept vary widely, the effective-
ness of electonic surveillance is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, the utility of govern-
ment intercepts can, in most cases, be questioned as an investigatory tool on empirical
grounds. Between 1973 and 1983, arrests arising out of intercepts fell from 3030 to
1716. During the same period convictions fell from 1833 (60.57o) to 521 (30.47o). AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS Au-
THORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS 23
(table 9) (1983)[hereinafter U.S. COURTS REPORT (1983)]. Cf. U.S. COURTS REPORT
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governmental electronic surveillance concerned many legislators,
both proponents and opponents of police surveillance saw compro-
mise in their best interests. 97 Members previously opposed to elec-
tronic surveillance voted in favor of title III in order to guarantee
some procedural safeguards against unwarranted governmental in-
trusion.98 "Law and order" advocates also supported the bill, pre-
ferring electronic surveillance with some restrictions to a possible
outright prohibition.99
Title III was most remarkable in the scope of its provisions. It
expressly prohibited nonconsensual surveillance by private par-
ties.100 Nonconsensual surveillance by the federal government was
(1986), supra note 8, at 19-25, (tables 7 and 9)(noting that 27% of the 2393 persons
arrested in 1984 on the basis of surveillance information were convicted, even though
only 25% of intercepted communications in 1984 were considered incriminating).
In its report, the National Wiretapping Commission was sharply divided over the
desirability of police intercepts due to its high cost and relatively low record of
convictions:
A substantial minority of the Commission disagrees with [the majority's] broad gen-
eral approval of court-authorized wiretapping. This minority found that court-au-
thorized surveillance had been used successfully in a limited number of major cases,
and has resulted in the conviction of only a few upper-echelon crime figures; more
frequently, however, court-authorized surveillance has proven to be costly and gen-
erally unproductive, has served to discourage the use of other investigative tech-
niques, and, even under the authorization and supervision of a court, has resulted in
substantial invasions of individual privacy.
NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at xiii. See also Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 35 (quoting
former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark's opposition to electronic eavesdropping
because it is "neither effective nor highly productive").
96 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 182, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2242 (statement of Sen. Fong). Early detractors of title III would likely
feel some vindication in the number of individuals subjected to surveillance since the
Act's passage. From 1977 to 1983 alone, it is estimated that the govenment has moni-
tored at least 370,000 people. HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 38.
97 NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 40; Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1732-
33.
98 NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 40. Not all of the Act's oppositon was persuaded,
however. Particularly vocal in his continued opposition was Senator Edward Long who
stated that to "help eliminate crime in the streets, Congress is asked to sell its soul for a
mess of porridge." S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 161, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2223. See Title III andAdmissibility, supra note 19, at 1732-33.
99 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 1-146, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2112-2209. Advocates of title III viewed the Act primarily as a tool
against organized crime. 115 CONG. REC. 23,238 (1969)(statement of Sen.John McClel-
Ian). Title III was, in fact, designed to afford federal and state law enforcement agents
greater flexibility in investigating top mob leaders. NWC COMMISSION STUDIES, supra
note 4, at 6. See generally E. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 49-71 (1974); Goldsmith,
supra note 13, at 22-23; Comment, supra note 42, at 501-03; Title III and Admissibility, supra
note 19, at 1732-33.
100 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1986). Calculating the level of illegal interceptions conducted
by private parties is a highly suspect practice because most interceptions go undetected
and, once detected, most go unreported. OTA REPORT, supra note 51, at 13. According
to FBI spokesman William Carter, the number of illegal interceptions of private parties
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prohibited in the absence of a court order.10 1 Nonconsensual sur-
veillance by state authorities was prohibited unless authorized under
a state statute' 0 2 containing a standard as restrictive as the federal
standard.'0 3 To insure compliance with the statute's objectives, a
court order system was established to handle federal electronic sur-
veillance requests as well as a system of civil damages to remedy
surveillance abuses. 10 4 Moreover, unlike its legislative forerunners,
by private parties declined from 524 reported incidents in 1981 to 392 reported inci-
dents in 1984. Horgan, supra note 42, at 32. Cost may also be a factor in explaining the
drop in illegal intercepts. Modern communications technology, primarily microwave
telephone circuits, are very expensive to intercept. Id. at 14 (current costs of microwave
intercept equipment approximately $40,000). For a description of the type of devices
available to private parties on a more modest scale, see NWC HEARINGS, supra note 93,
at 1212-29 (variety of devices and advertisements, including "Sea Captain" wall ther-
mometer and hidden mike model, $69.50; "Micro Mini Mike," powerful wireless mike
the size of a paper clip with 450 foot range, $14.95); S. DASH, R. ScnwARTz & R. KNOWL-
TON, supra note 46, at 349-50 (parabolic mike called "The Snooper" permits eavesdrop-
ping from distances of 500 feet, $12.98); J. CEDERBAUM, WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING: THE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7
(1969)("Bugged Martini" is a $500 plastic olive containing a transmitter and a miniature
antenna in the guise of a toothpick).
101 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
102 As of January, 1985, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted
such statutes authorizing state electronic surveillance. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
3004 to 3014 (1978 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-15-101 to 104 (1986 &
Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187 to 189 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to 556 (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 934.01-.10 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 to 3010
(1983); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-41 to 49 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-6701 to
6709 (1987 & Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to 2519 (1981 & Supp. 1987);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1301 to 1312 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to 412 (1984 & Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
272, § 99 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.A.01-.23 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to 712 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 179.410-515 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1 to A:11 (1986 & Supp.
1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to 26 (West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-1 to
11 (1984); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 176.1-.14 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721
to .739 (1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1988); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 12-5.1-1 to 16 (1981 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 23A-
35A-1 to 21 (Supp. 1987); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1988)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to 11 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-61 to 70 (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030 to .090 (1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 62-ID-1 to 16
(Supp. 1988); WIsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-3-601 to
610 (1987).
103 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 66. By the close of 1984, thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia had taken advantage of the authorization under section 2516
through the passage of statutes which permitted the use of electronic surveillance by
their state law enforcement officers. U.S. COURT REPORT (1984), supra note 94, at 9
(table 1); OTA REPORT (1985), supra note 51, at 19.
104 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Actual or punitive damages are allowed
along with attorney fees and other litigation costs. Id. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606
F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(monetary damages for intangible injury permitted under
19881
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title III also directly addressed the issue of consensual surveillance,
albeit to allow its unregulated use by private and governmental
parties.105
Title III's language takes the form of a series of statutory "do's"
and "don't's." 0 6 The Act begins with a sweeping prohibition of all
electronic surveillance, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically pro-
vided."' 10 7 This prohibition, contained in section 2511, essentially
makes everything under the Act a "don't" unless affirmatively stated
as a "do." The prohibition in section 2511 is followed by a list of
enumerated "do's," including the following:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under
color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication,
where such person is a party to the communication or one of the par-
ties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception. 108
A codification of Rathbun's consensual distinction, this subsection
places consensual surveillance outside the federal warrant require-
§ 2520); Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930
(1979); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 570 F. Supp. 826 (D.S.C. 1983)(attorney fees); Gerrard v.
Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1975)(permissible damages under § 2520 in-
clude injuries of extreme emotional harm).
105 In addition to the civil damages available under § 2520 to injured parties in fed-
eral actions, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have incorporated § 2520
or similar provisions into their own state privacy statutes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2(b)
(West 1970 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41r (West 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1336(w) (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-554 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 934.10 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803.48 (1985 & Supp. 1987);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6709 (1987 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38 para 14-6 (Smith-
Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2518 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:1312 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 711 (1980 & Supp.
1987); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-410 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
272, § 99(Q) (West 1980); MicH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 750.539h (West 1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626A.13 (West 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1I (1986); NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:156A-24 (West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-11 (1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 133.739 (1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5725 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-
5.1-13 (1981); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 18.20(16) (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-23a-11 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-69 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.73.060 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-12 (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 968.31(2) (d) (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 7-3-609 (1987). See also Goldsmith, supra note
13, at 76 n.454. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1986). These statutes generally follow the lan-
guage of the civil damages provision before the recent amendments. See supra note 26.
106 NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 4 ("Title III takes the form of a series of limitations
and prohibitions on lawful eavesdropping: the do's' are largely the residue of multitudi-
nous dont's'.").
107 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
108 Id. at § 2511 (2)(c). Private consensual surveillance is also permitted under the Act
so long as the surveillance is not done "for the purpose of committing any criminal or
tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State."
Id. at § 2511(2)(d).
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ments and procedural safeguards of the Act.109
How the consensual distinction in section 2511 relates to state
statutes enacted pursuant to title III is unclear, however.1 10 Title III
expressly permits states to enact their own surveillance statutes so
long as those statutes contain standards as stringent as the federal
standards."' States opposed to warrantless consensual surveillance
have taken advantage of this authorization by enacting statutes con-
taining provisions that strictly limit or ban entirely 1 2 the use of war-
rantless consensual surveillance by state agents. 113 These states
interpret title III's authorization of more stringent state standards as
implicitly including areas in which Congress chose not to limit sur-
veillance as well as those areas in which the limitations are minimal.
The federal courts, however, have adopted an alternative inter-
pretation of title III's authorization. When asked to suppress evi-
dence gathered unlawfully under state consensual provisions,
federal courts have unanimously rejected the applicability of the
provisions in federal court. 114 According to these courts, the con-
sensual distinction in section 2511 confines the Act's provisions, in-
cluding its authorization of more stringent state statutes, to
nonconsensual surveillance.115 Section 2511, therefore, is viewed as
a provision excluding all consensual surveillance from the operation
of the Act as a whole rather than a specific standard for the conduct
of consensual surveillance by federal agents." 16
109 The legislative history states that subsection 2511(2)(c) is largely a codification of
existing law. The Senate report cites Lopez, Rathbun, and On Lee as the sources for that
codification. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 93-94, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2182.
110 See United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1974)("It is not clear [from
section 251 I's language] ... that Congress showed an intention to displace more rigor-
ous requirements found in state laws."); Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1736
n.162 (section 2511 ambiguous at best in supplanting of state standards in federal
court).
111 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 98, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 2187.
112 See statutes cited supra note 18.
113 Id. A number of states also ban consensual surveillance by private parties. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(3), (4) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d)(West
1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, para. 14-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV
STAT. ANN. § 711 (1980) & Supp. 1987); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-
402(c)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (West 1980);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.539c (West 1968); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(c)
(1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4) (Purdon 1983).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); United States v.
Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
"15 Id.
116 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 650 ("Title III is addressed to the interception of wire or
oral communications where there has not been one-party consent.").
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The proper interpretation of section 2511, therefore, depends
largely on where one places section 2511 in the overall context of
the Act. Title III can be viewed as having dual purposes. First, it is
a federal regulation, stating the controlling standards for all federal
surveillance operations. Second, it is a national legislative model,
supplying states with the minimal statutory protections required
under the Act. Viewed as part of the Act's federal regulatory func-
tion, the consensual distinction presents few problems for states op-
posed to warrantless consensual surveillance. Under this view,
consensual distinction in section 2511 is simply a specific standard
governing federal surveillance operations. Accordingly, although
the Act's standard for federal operations is the unlimited use of war-
rantless consensual surveillance, nothing prevents a state from en-
acting a more stringent consensual provision." 17
Viewed as part of the Act's function as a national legislative
model, however, section 2511's consensual distinction takes on a
wholly different meaning. The consensual distinction, it can be ar-
gued, was not a specific standard, but was instead an intentional lim-
itation of the Act's scope by Congress." l8 In other words, the
national legislative model is exclusively nonconsensually based, and,
accordingly, all state statutes enacted under the Act must also be
nonconsensually based.
This Article argues that section 251 1's consensual distinction is
part of the federal regulatory function. However, before examining
the specific statutory support for this position, it is important to un-
derstand why federal courts should apply any state law, consensual
or nonconsensual. 119 Clearly, prior to addressing the consensual
question, a federal court must first ask whether a higher state non-
consensual standard must be considered in determining the admis-
sibility of state-derived surveillance evidence in federal court. 120
This threshold question is vital because federal courts that reject the
application of state nonconsensual laws will necessarily rule out the
application of state consensual laws as well. Moreover, this Article
asserts that many of the arguments used by courts to apply state
nonconsensual standards in federal court are equally persuasive for
applying state consensual standards. 12 1
117 See infra notes 202-33 and accompanying text.
118 See, e.g., Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 648.
119 See Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1741-42.
120 Id.
121 See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
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A. THE MAJORITY RULE AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST APPLYING
STATE SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS
The majority rule is based on a narrow interpretation of the
language and legislative history of title III. Beginning with the pre-
sumption that federal law controls over state law unless the federal
statute expressly states otherwise, 122 majority rule courts have con-
cluded that title III's critical provisions are too ambiguous to sup-
port the application of state law. 123 While recognizing that title III
does allow more stringent state standards, these courts have re-'
jected the application of such standards in federal court without a
more clear expression of congressional intent. Thus, in majority
rule courts, the unlawful gathering of electronic surveillance evi-
dence by state agents will not result in the suppression of the evi-
dence in federal court unless the evidence would also violate the
minimal federal standard.
In United States v. McNulty, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit considered the majority rule in both a three-
judge panel decision 124 and in a subsequent en banc decision which
reversed the panel decision and adopted the minority rule. 125 Writ-
ing a concurrence in the panel decision, Judge William Doyle ar-
gued in favor of the majority rule and its narrow reading of titl6 III.
This concurrence remains one of the most complete presentations
of the majority rule.126
McNulty involved the use of an illegal state wiretap to gather
evidence against the defendant, a local gambling figure, for state
gambling violations.' 27 After conducting the illegal wiretap, Colo-
rado authorities turned over all of their evidence to federal prosecu-
tors, who, in turn, brought charges under the federal gambling
laws. 128 After a district court suppressed the evidence under Colo-
rado law, the three-judge panel reversed the lower court decision
and ruled that the evidence, gathered illegally under the state wire-
tap, was admissible.' 29
In his concurrence in the panel decision, Judge Doyle stressed
the absence of a clear, unambiguous mandate in the statute for ap-
122 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1724-29.
123 See, e.g., United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); United States
v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1248-58 (10th Cir. 1984)(reversed en banc); United States v.
Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1233-35 (9th Cir. 1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
124 United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1244-63 (10th Cir. 1984).
125 Id. at 1264.
126 Id. at 1250-56 (Doyle, J, concurring).
127 Id. at 1248.
128 Id. at 1249.
129 Id. at 1248.
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plying state surveillance standards in federal court. Beginning with
the assumption that "this case should be governed by federal law
inasmuch as the cause is being tried in federal court and is a crimi-
nal charge ... aris[ing] under federal statutes," 130 Judge Doyle ex-
amined title III for any express instruction to the contrary. Finding
little reference to state law, he concluded that "Title III is ambigu-
ous on the question, and does not direct reference to state law."' 3'
Moreover, Judge Doyle rejected claims that Congress' authorization
of more stringent state laws evidences a congressional intent that
state laws should be applied in federal court.' 32 Although he stated
that it is clear that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws in
state court, 133 Judge Doyle concluded that the statute was too "am-
biguous" to support the application of state law in federal court. 134
The majority rule presumption against applying state standards
is equally evident in another leading majority rule case, United States
v. Hall. 13 5 In Hall, state police violated California's surveillance stat-
ute by using federal wiretap information, in a manner prohibited
under the state standard, to make a narcotics arrest. After seizing
damaging evidence against the defendants, the state prosecutor
handed over the evidence to his federal counterpart who convicted
both defendants in federal court.' 36 Although accepting that the ev-
idence seized by the state agents would have been suppressed in
state court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the evidence was admissible. 37
The court in Hall specifically rejected a defense argument based
on section 2517 of the Act. 138 This section authorizes the disclosure
of surveillance evidence gathered under title III. Subsections
2517(1) and (2) respectively authorize federal and state officers to
disclose or use intercepted material as long as their actions are in
accord with their official duties. 139 The two prerequisites of this
130 Id. at 1250 (Doyle, J., concurring).
131 Id. at 1251 (Doyle, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 1253 (Doyle, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 1253 (Doyle, J., concurring)(citing S. REP. 1097, supra note 13, at 98, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2187).
134 McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1251 (Doyle, J., concurring).
135 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976).
136 Id. at 1237-38 (Koelsch, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1230.
138 Id. at 1233.
139 Subsections 2517(1) and (2) provide:
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by
this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral or elec-
tronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such con-
tents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such
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provision are: the lawful interception of the original material and
the disclosing party's authority to receive such material under title
III. The defense in Hall argued that the use of the federal wiretap
evidence violated section 2517 because, under California law, "such
use by its officers [was] not appropriate to the proper performance
of [their] official duties.' -140 The Ninth Circuit rejected the section
2517 argument by stating that it is difficult to believe "that the quali-
fying phrase [concerning proper official duties] in section 2517 (1)
and (2) was . . .intended to obliquely import state standards."' 4'
"Had that been the aim," the Hall court stressed, "Congress would
have said so more clearly." 142
Both the McNulty and Hall majority opinions were accompanied
by strong dissents arguing in favor of the minority rule.' 43 The dis-
senting opinion in McNulty ultimately was adopted by the Tenth Cir-
cuit en banc in near-verbatim form in that circuit's break from the
majority rule camp. 144 Six circuits expressly follow the majority
rule, 45 while the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 146 have joined the
disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the
officer making or receiving the disclosure.
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by
this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral or elec-
tronic communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to
the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official
duties.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2517(1) and (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
140 Hall, 543 F.2d at 1233 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
141 Id. ("Instead we view the phrase [appropriate to the proper performance of their
official duties'] as designed to protect the public from unnecessarily widespread dissemi-
nation of the contents of interceptions and from the wholesale use of information
gleaned from a legal wiretap by an officer-state or federal-for personal or illegal
purposes.").
142 Id.
143 McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1258; Hall, 543 F.2d at 1238 (Koelsch, J., dissenting).
144 McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1264-69. The Tenth Circuit actually voted unanimously in
favor of the minority rule interpretation. The dissent to the en banc opinion occurred
over the interpretation of a state statute. Id. at 1269.
145 In addition to the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, courts in the First, Third,
and Ninth Circuits have indicated some movement away from the majority rule. See, e.g.,
United States v.Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889, 900 (1st Cir. 1984)(expressly avoiding the major-
ity rule as basis for applying federal law in favor of distinguishing facts from those of
leading minority rule cases); United States v. Daniel, 667 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.
1982)(expressly reserving question whether "information acquired by a state officer in
violation of state law without federal involvement is admissible in federal court.");
United States v. Mora, 623 F. Supp. 354, 358 (D. Mass. 1985)(endorsing minority rule);
United States v. Geller, 560 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1983)("[S]tate law standards
which relate to the issuance and execution of a wiretap order predominate where they
are more demanding than federal ones."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 786 (1985); United
States v. Pine, 473 F. Supp. 349, 357 (D. Md. 1978)(state laws govern application, au-
thorization, and execution of state orders). For a discussion of a recent First Circuit
private surveillance case employing many minority rule arguments, see infra note 307.
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Second Circuit in applying state surveillance standards in federal
court.
B. THE MINORITY RULE AND THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
APPLYING STATE LAW
The majority rule's assumption, that had Congress intended to
"obliquely import state standards . . . [it] would have said so more
clearly,"' 47 is strongly contested by minority rule courts, which ar-
gue that precisely the opposite should be true.1 48 Responding to
the majority rule's demand for statutory clarity of congressional in-
tent, Judge M. Oliver Koelsch suggested that "[h]ad Congress in-
tended by Title III to obliterate the more restrictiverules of conduct
... it certainly could have said so more clearly."' 14 9 Moreover, mi-
nority rule courts have argued that there is ample evidence in both
title III's language and legislative history to support the application
of state standards in federal court.
Minority rule courts argue against the very essence of the ma-
jority rule position: that there is a conflict between title III and
more stringent state laws.' 50 No conflict exists, it is argued, because
the state standards are themselves part of title I1. 15 1 Minority rule
courts insist that Congress intended to incorporate state standards
into title III, thereby making certain violations of state standards
collateral violations of the federal Act as well.' 52 In support of this
position, minority rule courts point to critical provisions of title III
that, these courts contend, cannot be implemented without refer-
ence to state standards. State standards, it is argued, must be con-
sidered in order to resolve three determinative issues under the Act:
the legality of the court order authorizing an interception; the legal-
ity of the actual interception conducted; and the authority of the
publishing agent to disclose or use the surveillance material.
Section 2516 governs the legality of a court order.' 53 Subsec-
tion 2516(2) expressly authorizes state judges to grant requests for
146 See, e.g., United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1984). See supra
note 145 for circuits indicating possible shifts to the minority rule.
147 Hall, 543 F.2d at 1233.
148 See, e.g., Hall, 543 F.2d at 1239 (Koelsch, J., dissenting); see also Title III and Admissi-
bility, supra note 19, at 1729-37.
149 Hall, 543 F.2d at 1239 (Koelsch, J., dissenting).
150 See, e.g., id. at 1239-40 (Koelsch, J., dissenting).
151 Id. See also Navarra v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 831, 833
(E.D. Mich. 1981).
152 See generally Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1729.
153 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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state interceptions but only "in conformity ... with the applicable
State statute .... "-54 Citing section 2516, minority rule courts
stress that title III predicates a "lawful authorization" on compli-
ance with both federal and state provisions. 155 The lawfulness of a
state authorization, they argue, can only be determined by reference
to the state court order and the state standards governing its execu-
tion. 156 This question, it is further argued, ultimately controls the
admissibility of such evidence because the Act expressly mandates
the suppression of any evidence derived from an unlawful
authorization. 157
The legality of an interception is important for the purposes of
section 2517, the provision governing the disclosure of surveillance
material under the Act. 158 Subsection 2517(3), which covers disclo-
sure by private parties, stipulates that disclosure of surveillance ma-
terial can occur only when the material was "intercepted in
accordance with the provisions of [title III]."' 159 Minority rule
154 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). The full text provides:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attor-
ney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of
that State to make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an
order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral or electronic commu-
nications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with
section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an order authoriz-
ing, or approving the interception of wire, oral or electronic communications by
investigative or law enforcement officers having responsibility for the investigation
of the offense as to which the application is made, when such interception may pro-
vide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marijuana
or other dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, designated in any applicable
State statute authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing offenses.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
155 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1259 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d
1229, 1241 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977);
United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, 615-17 (D. Md. 1974). See also Title III and
Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1730.
156 Id.
157 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1731 ("[s]ection 2517, in conjunction
with the minority rule's interpretation of section 2516, prohibits federal courts from
admitting any surveillance evidence that was gathered unlawfully under state law.").
158 For the text of section 2517, see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
159 Under subsection 2517(3), a person may disclose or use title III material if that
person is authorized to receive such material under the Act and if the interception was
lawfully conducted under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1982 &c Supp. IV 1986). The
lawful interception condition may only be determined by reference to the interception
authorization provision, which is subsection 2516(2). In the McNulty court's view, the
language in subsection 2517(3) strengthened the argument that "[tihe primary question
governing admissibility is whether the information was lawfully intercepted within the
meaning of the statute." McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1259.
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courts assert that the only way to determine the legality of an inter-
ception is to look at the authorization given for it. Thus, it is ar-
gued, a federal court must turn to the provision governing lawful
authorization, section 2516, which requires compliance with state
law. Disclosure of state surveillance material then is dependent on a
lawful state authorization which, minority rule courts argue, is de-
pendent on state law.
Minority rule courts also stress the type of authorization neces-
sary for proper disclosure under section 2517. As mentioned
above, subsections 2517(1) and (2) allow the disclosure or use of
surveillance evidence only if "such disclosure is appropriate to the
proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or
receiving the disclosure."'160 State surveillance standards often ex-
pressly forbid state agents from disclosing or using unlawfully gath-
ered surveillance evidence in any way. Minority rule courts argue
that subsections 2517(1) and (2) cannot reasonably be followed in
cases involving disclosures by state agents without applying the con-
trolling state disclosure provisions. 16'
Finally, minority rule courts direct attention to the suppression
provision in title III, subsection 2518(10)(a).1 62 Section 2518 re-
quires courts to suppress evidence when one of three circumstances
are shown. First, a court must suppress any evidence that was "un-
lawfully intercepted."' 163 Second, a court must suppress evidence
that was gathered under an invalid court order.' 64 Third, a court
must suppress evidence that was derived from an interception that
was "not made in conformity with the order of authorization or ap-
160 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1976).
162 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982). Subsection 2518(10)(a) provides:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents
of any intercepted wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter,
or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is
insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authoriza-
tion or approval.
Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding unless there was
no opportunity to make such motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of
the motion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral
communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been ob-
tained in violation of this chapter.
163 Id. at § 2518(10)(a)(i).
164 Id. at (ii).
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proval."'165 All three of these conditions, and particularly the last
two, it is argued, necessarily require the application of state law.' 66
In addition to this statutory support, minority rule courts stress
title III's legislative history. Crucial to the Act's passage, they argue,
was the invitation to states to enact more stringent laws of their
own.' 67 The Senate report that accompanied the proposed Act
states that Congress in enacting the Act "envision[ed] that States
would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no legislation
at all, but not less restrictive legislation."'' 68 This policy of state ex-
perimentation, it has been argued, was the product of a careful com-
promise between "civil libertarians" and "law and order
advocates.' 169 The policy enabled states unsatisfied with the mini-
mal federal standard to protect privacy rights to'a greater extent
than the federal government while guaranteeing that no state would
have fewer protections than the federal model. This compromise
helped form the coalition that led to the Act's passage, a coalition
that included congressmen interested in banning electronic surveil-
lance entirely and others in favor of leaving the issue entirely to the
states. 70
As noted earlier, until recently, only the Second Circuit fol-
lowed the minority rule and applied state standards in federal court.
In 1985, however, two circuits, the Tenth and the Eleventh, broke
from their previous adherence to the majority rule and adopted the
minority rule. 171 These circuits, however, limit the minority rule in
a very significant way.' 7 2 State law is applied only in cases that in-
165 Id. at (iii).
166 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1264 (10th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
See also Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1731-32.
Title III also contains an exclusionary rule, section 2515, which requires the exclu-
sion from evidence of any wire or oral communication "if the disclosure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of [title III]." 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). This exclusionary
rule extends to evidence "directly or indirectly obtained in violation of [title III]." S.
REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 96. See also United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 488 (1st
Cir. 1987)(suppressing illegally gathered evidence under section 2515).
167 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1242 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Title III
and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1732.
168 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 98, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2187.
169 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1732.
170 Id.
171 See United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1017 (1985); United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
172 The Second and Tenth Circuits have also limited the minority rule to interception
cases. See, e.g., McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1260; Sotomayor, 592 F.2d at 1222-27. See also United
States v. Mora, 623 F. Supp. 354, 358 (D. Mass. 1985). Like consensual state laws, viola-
tions of post-interception laws, such as the rules governing the sealing of tapes, are
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volve nonconsensual surveillance.1 73 Thus, minority rule courts ap-
ply federal, not state, standards in cases involving surveillance
conducted with the consent of one of the parties to a
conversation.1 74
C. THE MINORITY RULE'S CONSENSUAL DISTINCTION: LIMITING STATE
EXPERIMENTATION UNDER TITLE III
The minority rule's consensual distinction is based on a narrow
interpretation of subsection 2511(2)(c). By stating that warrantless
consensual surveillance is "not unlawful under this chapter,"1 75 mi-
nority rule courts present subsection 2511(2)(c) as a clear expres-
sion of congressional intent to exempt consensual surveillance from
the procedures and restrictions of the Act.176 Thus, minority rule
courts will admit the evidence in federal court even when such evi-
dence was gathered unlawfully by state agents and suppressed by
state courts.
Nowhere are the statutory arguments and the practical implica-
tions of this distinction more clear than in the case of United States v.
expressly placed outside the minority rule. Title III, it is argued, mandates the applica-
tion of:
only those more stringent state statutory requirements or standards that are
designed to protect an individual's right of privacy, as distinguished from proce-
dural rules that are essentially evidentiary in character.... Since a state's protection
of privacy normally reflects principles central to its social and governmental order,
our failure to respect its more stringent protection of privacy rights would not only
violate principles of federalism, but encourage state and federal law enforcement to
by-pass state law and to engage in federal forum-shopping of tainted evidence.
Sotomayor, 592 F.2d at 1225. Although this Article is only concerned with consensual
surveillance, the Author finds the post-interception distinction no less problematic. It is
difficult to discern the fundamental difference, in terms of privacy and federalism, be-
tween interception and post-interception violations. Both are often intended to protect
individual rights and the violation of either in state court could result in the suppression
of the evidence. State agents are no less "encourage[d] ... to by-pass state law and to
engage in federal forum-shopping of tainted evidence" when the evidence is suppressed
under a post-interception provision than under an interception provision. Id. See also
Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1735 n.161.
173 See, e.g., McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1266; United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d at 253 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d at 1371 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1051 (1976).
174 It should be noted that, with regard to the consensual distinction, there is no dif-
ference between the interpretation given section 2511 by majority or minority rule
courts. Compare McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 and Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219 (minority rule
courts applying consensual distinction) with United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319 (7th
Cir. 1979) and United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(majority rule
courts applying consensual distinction). The following discussion includes considera-
tion of arguments presented by both majority and minority rule courts.
175 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1982 & Supp 1986).
176 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1266 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Geroasi.177 In this case, the State's Attorney's office in Chicago
monitored a series of conversations between a government informer
and an attorney, John Gervasi, over a two-month period.' 7
Although done with the consent of a participating undercover
agent, the State's Attorney's office decided not to apply for a court
order, as required under Illinois' "all-party" consent law.179 The
consensual surveillance produced evidence against Gervasi and a
co-defendant of the attempted bribery of a police officer.180 This
evidence, however, was later held inadmissible by the Illinois
Supreme Court.' 8 1 Applying Illinois' "all-party" consent law, the
state supreme court held that such evidence is inadmissible without
either the consent of all of the parties to the conversation or a court
order authorizing nonconsensual surveillance.' 8 2
Unable to use the suppressed evidence in state court, the assis-
tant state's attorneys asked their counterparts in the United States
Attorney's office to prosecute the two defendants under the federal
consensual standard.'8 3 Without the suppressed evidence, they
said, "the state case against Gervasi and... [his co-defendant] was
unprovable."' 8 4 The United States Attorney's office agreed and, af-
ter four and one-half years of being prosecuted by the State's Attor-
ney's office, the two defendants found themselves in federal court
facing the same evidence previously suppressed in state court.18 5
On a defense motion to suppress the evidence in federal court, how-
ever, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois refused to follow the state "all-party" consent law and held
the evidence admissible under subsection 2511(2)(c).18 6
In admitting the evidence, the Gervasi court relied heavily on
two consensual cases that admitted surveillance evidence under sim-
ilar circumstances. The first case, United States v. Nelligan,'8 7 in-
177 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The Seventh Circuit is a majority rule court.
For a minority rule court's rationale for the consensual distinction, see Sotomayor, 592
F.2d at 1225.
178 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 636.
179 ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, para. 14-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1988).
180 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 634-36.
181 Id. at 635.
182 Id.
183 Id. Meeting in a bar with a federal counterpart, an assistant state's attorney stated
that "the reason the Gervasi case was sent over to federal court was that the state couldn't
get a fair shake ... from [the presiding judge],' and that "[w]e can try our case over
there better than we can in front of [the judge] .... '). Id. at 636.
184 Id. at 635.
185 Id. The state prosecution was dropped three hours before the federal charges
were brought.
186 Id.
187 573 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978).
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volved a Florida detective who, in violation of state law, recorded an
incriminating conversation with the defendant to show that the lat-
ter was defrauding the telephone company. 188 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit' 8 9 refused to consider the
state law in admitting the evidence. Although suggesting that it
might be necessary to consider "relevant state law" as part of the
federal standard in some cases, the Fifth Circuit stated that such in-
corporation is clearly ruled out in consensual cases by subsection
2511(2)(c). 90
The second case cited in Gervasi was United States v. Shaffer, 19 in
which Delaware police violated that state's "all-party" consent rule
in gathering evidence against the defendant in an extortion case. 192
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence under state law.
Pointing out that the consensual surveillance is lawful for federal
operations, the Third Circuit also warned that "[i]f the states could
require federal courts to exclude evidence in federal criminal cases,
some convictions would undoubtedly be lost, and the enforcement
of congressional policy would be weakened."' 193
Interestingly, the Gervasi court, in dicta, did endorse the minor-
ity rule, even though the Seventh Circuit itself still ostensibly fol-
lows the majority rule. 194 Interpreting subsection 2516(2), the
court noted that "[t]he effect of this section is to adopt as a part of
federal law the more stringent standards (if any) of the state wiretap
law .... [so that] evidence ... obtained in violation of state law'
(made federal law by Title III's incorporation provision) ... is inad-
missible in federal court."' 195
The Gervasi court, however, followed its endorsement of the mi-
nority rule with a critical interpretation of the Act as a whole. That
interpretation is often left unstated by minority rule courts in deal-
ing with consensual cases. Although federal courts must apply state
standards in cases involving the legality of a court order, the court
stated, "[t]his is a statutory protection [only] afforded by Congress
188 Id. at 253.
189 Nelligan was handed down before the division of the Fifth Circuit. Florida is now
part of the Eleventh Circuit, which is a minority rule circuit.
190 573 F.2d at 254.
191 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975).
192 Id. at 1371.
193 Id. at 1372. Cf. United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984)(applying
federal law to illegal state car search so as to avoid loss of conviction, saying that a state
officer is already "punished" by the exclusion of evidence in the state criminal trial).
194 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1717 n.14.
195 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 650.
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to those who come within the terms of the statute."1 96 Construing
subsection 2511(2) (c), the court concluded that title III is a noncon-
sensual surveillance statute and its provisions, including the provi-
sions incorporating state laws, relate only to nonconsensual
surveillance.197 "For those who do not come within the terms of
Title III-such as the defendants in this case-the added protec-
tions afforded by the Congressional adoption of the more stringent
state standards do not exist."' 98
The Gervasi court concluded that, without an express congres-
sional mandate to extend title III's incorporation provisions to state
consensual laws, the application of state standards in these cases
would raise serious questions of preemption under the supremacy
clause. 199 Such an extension would, in the court's opinion, result in
the unconstitutional intrusion of a state legislature into a federal
prosecution and would bar "the federal government from effectively
prosecuting people for violations of federal law." 20 0
Gervasi remains one of the best articulations of the consensual
distinction.20 ' The narrow interpretation of subsection 2511(2) (c)
that confines the incorporation provisions of the Act to nonconsen-
sual standards alone is fundamental to the consensual distinction.
Although acknowledging the Act does incorporate state standards
through provisions like subsection 2516(2), minority rule courts,
such as the Gervasi court, construe subsection 2511(2)(c) as affirma-
tively placing consensual surveillance outside of the operations and
privacy protections of the Act.
IV. SUBSECTION 2511(2)(c): FEDERAL REGULATORY STANDARD OR
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE MODEL?
Critical to the minority rule's consensual distinction is the inter-
pretation of subsection 2511(2)(c) as a statutory limitation on the
scope of the Act itself and not just another federal standard.20 2 As
was argued in Gervasi, subsection 2511(2)(c) can be construed as
196 Id.
197 Id. ("Title III is addressed to the interception of wire or oral communications
where there has not been one-party consent.").
198 Id.
199 Id. at 649-50 ("Such an interpretation would raise constitutional questions under
Article VI of the United States Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, if a state legislature
thus would be able to bar the federal government from effectively prosecuting people
for violations of federal law.").
200 Id.
201 See also United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1226 (2d Cir. 1979); United




making title III a nonconsensual surveillance statute, entirely di-
vorced from the use or misuse of consensual surveillance.203 This
argument is what was referred to earlier as the national legislative
model interpretation. 20 4 Subsection 2511(2)(c) can be construed
either as part of a federal regulatory function or a national legisla-
tive model function. The meaning of the consensual provision will
differ radically depending on how a court views the provision's func-
tion in terms of the Act as a whole. As part of a federal regulatory
function, the consensual provision is simply one of the standards
governing federal operations. Accordingly, while Congress chose a
standard of unlimited use of federally gathered consensual evi-
dence, states would still be entitled to apply their own more strin-
gent standards, as is the case with the Act's nonconsensual
standards.
Alternatively, a court can view subsection 2511(2)(c) as part of a
national legislative model function. This interpretation construes
the provision as shaping the national legislative model that must be
incorporated into any state surveillance statute. Although states are
entitled to enact more stringent standards, they cannot expand the
very scope of the Act itself. Thus, title III is presented by the minor-
ity rule courts as a nonconsensual statute that only allows for more
stringent state nonconsensual surveillance standards.
This section will look carefully at the statutory support for in-
terpreting subsection 2511(2)(c) as part of a federal regulatory func-
tion. A statutory analysis reveals ample evidence that the
consensual provision was meant as nothing more than a federal
standard subject to more stringent state laws. This Article will ar-
gue that a close examination of the Act's legislative history belies
any notion that subsection 2511(2) (c) was intended to serve a legis-
lative model function. Also, this Article will show why, even if the
Act is unclear as to the correct interpretation of the subsection,
courts should presume the applicability of state law. Drawing from
cases involving the federal preemption doctrine and other Supreme
Court doctrines, this Article will show why this interpretative pre-
sumption in favor of state law is solidly grounded in analogous cases
of concurrent state and federal regulation.
A. SUBSECTION 2511(2)(c) AND THE STATUTORY SUPPORT FOR
EXTENDING THE MINORITY RULE
Minority rule courts generally rely on the supposed plain mean-
203 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 650.
204 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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ing of subsection 2511(2)(c) to support their consensual distinction.
The admission of unlawfully gathered state evidence is often dealt
with perfunctorily with little more than a citation to subsection
2511(2)(c) and a conclusory sentence regarding its meaning. 20 5
This approach, however, is clearly inadequate because the fact that
it is not unlawful for federal officers to conduct warrantless consen-
sual surveillance does not resolve the question of whether federal
courts must look to state law when admitting evidence gathered by
state officers. Rather, the primary question is what constitutes the
federal law on consensual surveillance and whether, as with the non-
consensual standards, the federal law on consensual surveillance in-
corporates more stringent state consensual standards. 206
Some minority rule courts have realized that a simple citation to
subsection 2511(2)(c) is insufficient to support the consensual dis-
tinction and have attempted to reconcile their incorporation of non-
consensual state provisions with their nonincorporation of
consensual state provisions. These courts have stressed subsection
2516(2), the provision heavily relied upon by minority rule courts in
refuting the majority rule.20 7 As noted above, subsection 2516(2)
requires that any state authorization of electronic surveillance be
conducted "in conformity with . . . the applicable State statute
.... "208 This provision is used by minority rule courts as an "incor-
poration provision," incorporating state standards into the federal
standards applicable in federal court.20 9
In the consensual context, minority rule courts argue that the
incorporation of state standards in subsection 2516(2) was not
open-ended. Before state standards can be applied in federal
courts, these state standards must be "relevant," as well as more
stringent.210 Subsection 2511(2)(c), it is argued, makes consensual
standards irrelevant by its authorization of warrantless consensual
surveillance. Thus, while more stringent nonconsensual state stan-
dards are incorporated by subsection 2516(2), the incorporation
205 See, e.g., United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 937 (1979).
206 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1736 n.162.
207 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1259 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d
1229, 1241 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977);
United States v. Curreri, 388 F. Supp. 607, 615-17 (D. Md. 1974). See also Title III and
Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1730.
208 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For the text of subsection 2516(2),
see supra note 154.
209 United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
210 United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1978)(the federal statute
includes only "relevant" state law in the context of state court authorizations).
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policy has "no application to situations [like consensual surveil-
lance] outside the scope of the federal statute."2 1'
When the consensual provision is viewed as part of a federal
regulatory function, however, subsection 2516(2) and the Act's
other incorporation provisions take on a different and a more plau-
sible meaning. The dichotomy drawn by minority rule courts be-
tween nonconsensual and consensual surveillance is difficult to
devine from the language of the Act itself. Subsection 2511(2)(c) is
the only place in the entire Act in which consensual surveillance is
mentioned. Although it can be argued that this absence of statutory
reference evidences a congressional design to exclude consensual
surveillance from the scope of the Act, it is equally possible that the
nature of state surveillance was simply never meant to be determina-
tive for purposes of admissibility under the Act. In all of the Act's
provisions affecting the admissibility of state evidence, title III con-
centrates on the legality of the state agent's conduct vis-a-vis the
controlling state standards. Under these provisions it is the nature
of the officer's conduct, not the nature of the surveillance itself, that
is determinative under the Act's exclusionary rule. Critical sections,
such as section 2517 and section 2518, are written to mandate ad-
herence by state agents to their own laws in intercepting, disclosing,
or using state surveillance evidence. A close examination of these
provisions refutes any suggestion that Congress intended the obli-
gation of a state officer to obey state laws to change with the fortuity
of one-party consent in a particular surveillance operation.
Title III places particular importance on the legality of the in-
terception conducted by federal and state agents. The criteria for
admissibility also appears in subsection 2517(3), which concerns in-
terceptions by private parties.21 2 More importantly, the lawful inter-
ception criteria is present in section 2518, which is the Act's
exclusionary provision. In section 2518, Congress made it quite
clear that evidence "unlawfully intercepted" must be suppressed. 213
It is interesting to note that the unlawful interception provision in
section 2518 is only one of the three circumstances requiring sup-
pression. The other two circumstances concern interceptions made
under an invalid court order214 and interceptions "not made in con-
formity with the order of authorization or approval." 2 15 Read with
these two latter provisions, the unlawful interception provision ap-
211 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 650.
212 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.





pears as something of a catch-all rule mandating the suppression of
evidence that, while gathered under a valid court order and in con-
formity with that court order, is nevertheless unlawful under the
controlling law. This would indeed be the case with consensual sur-
veillance and, while it cannot be shown that this first provision was
written to include consensual surveillance, the general suppression
mandate belies the strict interpretations put on the Act by the mi-
nority rule courts.
Another criteria for admissibility that is conduct-related is the
requirement of proper use and disclosure. Subsections 2517(1) and
(2) govern the use and disclosure of surveillance evidence by state
and federal agents.2 16 These provisions allow the disclosure of sur-
veillance evidence only when "such disclosure is appropriate to the
proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or
receiving the disclosure." 21 7 The use and disclosure provisions spe-
cifically target the conduct of the agent and the legality of that con-
duct under the controlling law. The intent of the provisions is clear:
to insure the accountability of federal and state officers to the stan-
dards that govern them. The nature of the surveillance is irrelevant
to this question because the violation of a consensual provision,
rather than a nonconsensual provision, will not make the conduct of
a state agent any more proper under state law.2 1 8
Like subsection 2516(2) and section 2518, the use and disclo-
sure provisions in section 2517 are used by minority rule courts to
support the application of state nonconsensual standards in federal
court.21 9 As one minority rule court noted, "[b]ecause the scope of
a state officer's official duties is defined by state, not federal, law,
Title III incorporates a state's rules on the use of wiretap informa-
tion by its own officers." 220 To ignore state law in judging the
proper conduct of state officers, it is argued, would be "to obliterate
the more restrictive rules of conduct which some states impose on
216 Id. at §§ 2517(1) & (2). See supra note 139 for the text of § 2517(1) and (2).
217 Id.
218 It is interesting to note the importance placed by minority rule courts on deterring
police misconduct in their argument against the majority rule. See, e.g., United States v.
Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (197 9)(sup-
porting the minority rule rather than "encourag[ing] state and federal law enforcement
officers to by-pass state law and to engage in federal forum-shopping of tainted evi-
dence"); United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1237, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch,
J., dissenting)(denouncing the majority rule as endorsing police abuse and forum
shopping).
219 See, e.g., Sotomayor, 592 F.2d at 1225-26 n.13; United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d
697, 702 (2d Cir. 1976).
220 Hall, 543 F.2d at 1239 (Koelsch,J., dissenting).
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their own law enforcement officers ... "221 Yet, as persuasive as
this argument is in the nonconsensual context, minority rule courts
have thus far refrained from applying it in consensual cases. 222 Nor
have minority rule courts explained how provisions requiring adher-
ence by state officers to state rules of conduct would be any less
compromised by a violation involving a consensual, as opposed to a
nonconsensual, standard.
Although neglected by minority rule courts in consensual cases,
these provisions offer strong support for the application of more
stringent state standards regardless of their consensual or noncon-
sensual character. The statutory inconsistencies in the consensual
distinction, however, are only part of the problem for minority rule
courts. The question remains why Congress, after granting great
discretion to states to enact more restrictive surveillance legislation,
would draw such a distinction in the first place. It would seem likely
that the exclusion of a major area of surveillance from a national
surveillance statute would be accompanied by some clear rationale
or explanation. This is particularly true when the exclusion results
in a significant loss of privacy protections under an Act in which the
protection of privacy was an overriding congressional concern.223
Not surprisingly, an examination of the Act's legislative history indi-
cates a congressional intent to simply establish a federal standard
subject generally to more stringent state standards-consensual or
nonconsensual.
A brief examination of title III's background and legislative his-
tory offers further evidence that Congress intended subsection
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1979).
223 This interpretation also draws into question the significance placed on the impor-
tance of federal participation in joint state-federal surveillance activities. A number of
courts circumvent the issue of the incorporation of state law by noting that surveillance
conducted with federal cooperation should be governed by federal, not state, law. See,
e.g., United States v. Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889, 899 (1st Cir. 1984), and United States v.
Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(rejecting the application of the minor-
ity rule to a joint state-federal operation). This issue has presented itself in another
form in state court where federal agents have been accused of gathering surveillance
evidence below state standards and then handing over the evidence to their state coun-
terparts for use in state court. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 617 P.2d
1012 (1980); State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 700 P.2d 711 (1985); Basham v. Com-
monwealth, 675 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1984); People v. Fidler, 72 Ill. App. 3d 924, 391
N.E.2d 210 (1979). In O'Neill, a dissenting judge strongly objected to what he felt was
the evisceration of state privacy laws under the guise of "[firee and open cooperation."
"[T]hat kind of cooperation is hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal
officers to withdraw from such association and at least tacitly to encourage state officers
in the disregard of constitutionally protected freedom." Id. at 728, 103 Wash. 2d at 884,
(Dore, J., dissenting)(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-22 (1960)).
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2511(2)(c) to have a federal regulatory, rather than a legislative
model, function. As stated above, the consensual distinction
originated in a series of Supreme Court cases stretching back to On
Lee v. United States.224 In drafting title III, Congress sought to codify
the constitutional guidelines established previously by the Court.225
In the nonconsensual area, this meant codifying the holdings and
dicta of cases like Katz and Berger, which supplied the foundation for
the Act's warrant procedures and privacy protections. In codifying
the Court's consensual holdings, Congress looked to cases such as
On Lee and Rathbun. As noted above, these cases left few, if any,
constitutional barriers to consensual surveillance.226 The Court had
repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to warrantless consen-
sual surveillance and, in Katz and Berger, had established a fourth
amendment test that all but ruled out challenges to consensual sur-
veillance and unreasonable searches.
The absolute language of subsection 2511(2)(c), therefore, was
not the manifestation of some overarching pro-consensual policy of
Congress, but was rather the simple codification of the law at that
time. The Act's legislative history supports this conclusion, refer-
ring directly to subsection 2511(2)(c) as largely a reflection of ex-
isting law. 227 Thus, title III's consensual standards, like its
nonconsensual standards, were the result of the minimal protections
articulated by the Supreme Court. In the case of consensual surveil-
lance, those protections were few and did not include a warrant pro-
cedure. In codifying this standing law, therefore, subsection
2511(2)(c) was written in absolutist terms: "It shall not be unlawful
under this chapter .... ,,228 Given the fact that the federal noncon-
sensual standards were the product of this same process, the codifi-
cation of the Court's minimum consensual protections should not
foreclose more stringent state laws or the application of those laws
in federal court.
Just as the origin of the consensual distinction supports the fed-
eral regulatory interpretation, other parts of the Act's legislative his-
tory do not support the argument that subsection 2511(2)(c) was
224 343 U.S. 747 (1952). See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
225 The Senate report on the Act cites three Supreme Court cases as part of its codifi-
cation of "existing law": Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Rathbun v.
United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). S.
REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 94, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
2183-84.
226 See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
227 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 94 ("[This provision] largely reflects existing
law.").
228 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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meant to limit the Act's incorporation provisions to more stringent
state nonconsensual standards. The Senate report that accompa-
nied the Act's final passage expressly authorized states to enact their
own surveillance standards. 229 Congress, the report states, "envi-
sions that States would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation,
or no legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation." 23 0 This
authorization of state experimentation became part of a compro-
mise packet that ultimately brought about the Act's passage in the
face of opposition from both sides. 231 From its inception, title III
was besieged by detractors claiming, on the one hand, that it would
unnecessarily restrict the work of police and prosecutors in combat-
ting organized crime and, on the other hand, that it would eviscerate
fundamental individual privacy rights. The Act's passage, as stated
previously, was the product of a careful compromise between these
"law and order advocates" and "civil libertarians.- 232 The policy of
state experimentation insured that states more concerned with mob-
fighting could operate close to the Court's minimal guidelines while
other states more concerned with individual privacy could radically
limit, and even ban entirely, the use of electronic surveillance.
This state experimentation policy is based in large part on the
view of title III as containing standards that are subject to change.
Civil libertarians such as Senator Bayh supported title III "reluc-
tantly" while calling for continued efforts to guarantee "that organ-
ized crime and not the individual citizen will become the target of
this [Act]." 233 Under the proposed Act, these efforts were to be car-
ried out at the state, as well as the federal, level. It would seem
strange for Congress to authorize such state experimentation but
then intentionally carve out an entire area of surveillance that many
feel is more, not less, troublesome for individual privacy. Moreover,
one attractive aspect of the policy of state experimentation for civil
libertarians was the possibility that states traditionally opposed to all
electronic surveillance could still ban it entirely. Yet, under the mi-
nority rule's legislative model interpretations, subsection 2511(2)(c)
blocks a federal court from giving any weight or deference to state
consensual laws and thereby significantly limits the power of these
states to execute anti-surveillance policies. A restriction of this sort
229 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 98, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 2187.
230 Id.
231 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1732-33.
232 Id.
233 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 187, reprnted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2246 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
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seriously undermines the very premise of state experimentation:
that states could go as far as they dared in limiting the use of elec-
tronic surveillance.
An examination of title III's statutory language and legislative
history, therefore, produces mixed results for a court wrestling with
the consensual question. First, critical sections of the Act seem to
presume the applicability of state law without reference to the na-
ture of the surveillance. Second, the background of the consensual
distinction indicates that subsection 2511(2) (c) was the result of the
simple codification of the law at that time and not a reflection of any
policy to limit the scope of the Act. Third, the legislative history of
the Act demonstrates a congressional intent to allow for state exper-
imentation, which was a critical element in the final compromise
package that led to the passage of the Act. Finally, however, it is
clear that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history
explicitly rule out the minority rule's consensual distinction.
Although the above statutory and historical sources strongly sup-
port the interpretation of subsection 2511(2)(c) as serving a federal
regulatory function, neither the Act nor its history affirmatively rule
out the consensual distinction. The following section, therefore,
considers how courts should resolve the consensual question in the
absence of unambiguous statutory language or legislative history.
B. A QUESTION OF DEFERENCE: RESOLVING STATUTORY AMBIGUITY
UNDER TITLE III
In arguing against the majority rule, minority rule courts reject
the requirement of majority rule courts that defendants must show a
clear statutory mandate before state nonconsensual standards can
be applied in federal court.234 While recognizing that title III does
not expressly authorize the application of state standards, minority
rule courts argue that, before state control over state officers is sev-
ered in federal court, it is incumbent upon the federal prosecutors
to show an intent by Congress to supersede more stringent state
laws.235 It would be illogical, one judge has noted, to "infer such
intent without a clearer expression by Congress. '236
The deference shown to state standards by minority rule courts
in the nonconsensual area, however, is distinctly absent in their
234 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1239 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch, J.,
dissenting) ("Had Congress intended by Title III to obliterate the more restrictive rules
of conduct which some states impose on their own... officers... it certainly could have





treatment of consensual cases. In these latter cases, minority rule
courts infer a congressional intent to divorce all consensual surveil-
lance operations from federal regulation solely on the basis of sub-
section 2511(2)(c).237 While this inference runs counter to the
statutory language and legislative history discussed above, minority
rule courts rarely measure the strength of their strict interpretation
of the consensual provision against the proper degree of deference
that should be accorded state law. Nevertheless, assuming that the
Act's statutory language and history are not persuasive to a court, it
is necessary to determine the extent to which a federal court should
presume the validity of a state law, absent a clear statutory mandate
to the contrary. To answer this question, it is necessary to look to
other areas in which the federal courts have had to deal with such
state and federal conflict.
There is no federal rule of statutory interpretation that applies
directly to the circumstances in these cases, namely, the interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous federal statute as to the application of state
exclusionary standards in federal court.238 The federal courts, how-
ever, have dealt with numerous areas involving conflicting concur-
rent state and federal regulation. Before deciding the proper
deference entitled state standards, courts can draw from these
analogous areas in gauging the degree of favorable presumption en-
titled to more stringent state standards under title III.
1. Subsection 2511(2)(c) and the Federal Preemption Doctrine
Since Gibbons v. Ogden,23 9 federal courts have applied the federal
preemption doctrine in cases involving conflicting state and federal
regulations. Derived from the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion,240 the federal preemption doctrine applies whenever a state
law regulates conduct in a way contrary to federal law or, alterna-
tively, regulates in an area where federal law has exclusive jurisdic-
tion.24 1 Pursuant to the supremacy clause, the doctrine demands
237 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir.
1975); United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Il. 1983).
238 For arguments supporting the use of the federal preemption doctrine by analogy
in nonconsensual cases, see Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1737-41.
239 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824)(holding that Congress may regulate all "commerce which
concerns more states than one").
240 The supremacy clause provides that the "Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby .... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
241 Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963).
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that, when there is a conflict between state and federal law, state law
must give way to federal law. 24 2
Federal preemption is periodically discussed in the title III con-
text in both state and federal courts. 243 In state court, the federal
preemption doctrine is often applied to resolve questions concern-
ing the latitude of state regulation allowed by title 111.244 Although
federal courts have also considered the doctrine directly in resolving
federal questions, 245 these courts generally use federal preemption
to mean simply the suggested subordination of a state law by a con-
flicting federal law.2 46 While federal preemption per se is not in-
volved in most federal cases, it is natural to look to past federal
preemption cases in resolving the question of applying more strin-
gent state surveillance standards in federal court. In the absence of
a directly applicable doctrine of statutory interpretation, it is possi-
ble to draw upon federal preemption tests by analogy to gain some
notion of the proper degree of deference generally accorded con-
flicting state regulations. Moreover, as is shown below, the federal
preemption test is critical when one considers the possible interpre-
tations used to support the minority rule's consensual distinction.
The nonincorporation of state consensual standards is in some
ways commensurate with traditional federal preemption situations
242 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
243 See generally Title III and Admissibiity, supra note 19, at 1737-41.
244 The questions in such cases often involve federally derived evidence and argu-
ments that state laws are preempted to the extent that they would exclude such evi-
dence. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 700 P.2d 711 (1985); Basham v.
Commonwealth, 675 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1984); State v. Farha, 218 Kan. 394, 544 P.2d 341
(1975); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975); People v.
Warner, 65 Mich. App. 267, 237 N.W.2d 284 (1975); People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259,
522 P.2d 1049, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241, (1974) dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
419 U.S. 1064 (1974). A couple of state courts have raised federalism concerns over the
exclusion of evidence in state court under section 2515. See e.g., In re Marriage of Lopp,
268 Ind. 690, 704, 378 N.E.2d 414, 421 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Halpin
v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 6 Cal.3d 885, 896, 495 P.2d. 1295, 1305,
101 Cal. Rptr. 375, 384, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972). For.a discussion of these cases
and general tenth amendment concerns in title III, see Michigan v. Meese, 666 F. Supp.
974 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
245 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 712 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1983); Ansley v.
Stynchcombe, 480 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632
(N.D. Ill. 1983); United States v. Proctor, 526 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Haw. 1981); Navarra v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, 510 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mich. 1981). The preemption
question is sometimes framed in terms of state law preempting federal law in federal
court. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The state
law cannot preempt the federal unless the federal act itself sanctions the application of
state standards.").
246 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d at 1239 n.6, 1240 n.7 (Koelsch,J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Van Horn, 579 F. Supp. 804, 810 (D. Neb. 1984).
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in which federal law limits or bars state regulatory power in an area.
In the nonconsensual cases, minority rule courts argue that, when
state surveillance evidence is involved, a state exclusionary rule is
controlling in both federal and state court. Minority rule courts,
however, limit that area of state regulation so that state exclusionary
rules are only applicable in federal court when they concern non-
consensual surveillance. This conflict between federal and state
standards, leading to the limitation of the permitted area of state
regulation, is easily analogized to federal preemption cases. The
minority rule's consensual distinction can be viewed as preempting
part of the state surveillance statute by limiting the reach of the state
exclusionary rule as to state-derived evidence. Although this com-
parison is by no means complete, the situations resulting from the
minority rule consensual distinction bear strong resemblance, from
the state perspective, to more traditional federal preemption cases.
A brief examination of federal preemption cases evidences a
strong presumption by the Supreme Court in favor of concurrent
state regulations. The Court has traditionally refused to invalidate
concurrent state standards without clear proof that these standards
violate the federal regulation or frustrate an intention by Congress
"to occupy the entire field" of regulation. 247 In Head v. New Mexico
Board, the Court developed a two-part test for determining preemp-
tion questions. 248 The Head test requires federal courts to presume
the validity of a state regulation unless there is either "evidence of a
congressional design to preempt the field. . . . " or "such actual
conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot
stand in the same area . . -249 Clearly, in terms of title III as a
whole, federal preemption cannot be found under either of these
247 People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 265-67, 522 P.2d 1049, 1052, 114 Cal. Rptr.
241, 244-46, (1974) dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 416 U.S. 1064 (1974).
248 372 U.S. 424, 430 (1963). See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963)("[F]ederal regulation of a field... should not be deemed preemp-
tive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons--either that the na-
ture of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress
has unmistakably so ordained.").
The Head test is useful for these purposes because of its two-part structure, yet
courts often simply state the test as one of congressional intent. See, e.g., Sims v. Dept.
of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 832 F.2d 1558, 1565 (11th Cir. 1987). Congres-
sional intent need not be expressly stated but rather can be "implicitly contained in [a
statute's] structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
249 Head, 374 U.S. at 430 (quoting Florida Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141). The two-
prong Head test originally posed the question of "actual conflict" first, but courts gener-
ally reverse the prongs. Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1738-39.
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two steps. 250 Both the Act's provisions and its legislative history ex-
pressly state that concurrent state surveillance regulation was envi-
sioned by Congress in enacting the Act.251
However, minority rule courts do not claim that all state stat-
utes are preempted under title III. Rather, these courts maintain
that one provision of the state statutes-the "all-party" consent
rule-is inapplicable in federal court. 252 Applied to the narrower
conflict between state and federal consensual provisions, only the
second step of the Head test remains relevant.253 Because it is clear
that a state can regulate in the area and that Congress did not intend
to occupy the entire regulatory field, a court must ask whether a
state "all-party" consent rule is in "actual conflict" with the federal
law. In answering this question, however, one court stressed that
"[p]reemption is not to be lightly inferred where Congress has al-
lowed for concurrent State regulation as long as the State statute is
substantially similar in design and effect to the Federal enactment or
where the State statute is, according to congressional directive,
more restrictive." 254 The thrust of federal preemption cases is to
assume a congressional intent for the coexistence of concurrent
state and federal statutes. 255 While a statute need not expressly
mandate preemption, the Court has required evidence of congres-
sional intent for preemption or in the very least a showing that state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes of Congress." 256
The minority rule's consensual distinction lacks any statutory
basis for its suggested statutory conflict beyond a strict interpreta-
tion of subsection 2511(2)(c). No legislative history is presented to
support this distinction, nor are there policy reasons for why Con-
gress would have acted in this way. Moreover, minority rule courts
insist on the presence of a conflict without considering the strong
250 But see Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1738 (applying Head by analogy to
nonconsensual cases).
251 Id.
252 See, e.g., United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1266 (10th Cir. 1984).
253 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1739 (Title III's plain meaning and legis-
lative history, refute any suggestion that "Congress intended to preempt the field-that
is, whether it intended to occupy an entire area of law to the exclusion of all state
regulation.").
254 Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 250, 327 N.E.2d 819, 835 (1975)(citing
Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)).
255 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
256 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
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policy and statutory arguments to the contrary.257
As noted above, 258 it is easy to argue that no conflict between
the two regulations exists when the consensual provision is viewed
from a federal regulatory perspective. Because the state provisions
do not attempt to control the conduct of federal agents or their op-
erations in the state, there is no conflict between the two statutes
beyond the conflict present in the nonconsensual area, namely the
use of unlawfully gathered state evidence. It can further be asserted
that no conflict is even possible since, as was argued by the minority
rule courts in the nonconsensual context, more stringent standards
are part of the federal law. 259
In order to supersede state surveillance standards under the
Head test, minority rule courts must accept, largely by fiat, the legis-
lative model argument. They must conclude that, without expressly
stating, Congress intended title III to be a regulation of nonconsen-
sual surveillance and never envisioned more stringent consensual
standards. Yet, this strict interpretation ignores the support in the
Act's language and legislative history discussed above. More impor-
tantly, this strict interpretation presumes the inapplicability of state
law absent a clear congressional mandate to the contrary. As the
Head test illustrates, the Supreme Court has always given the
favorable presumption to the states in areas of conflict. This pre-
sumption is traditionally even greater in areas of "historic police
powers .... ,"260 As the Court stated in Florida Avocado & Lime Grow-
ers v. Paul, "federal regulation of a field ... should not be deemed
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive
reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter per-
mits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained." 26 1
Thus, although federal preemption is not directly involved in
these consensual cases, the federal preemption tests and cases evi-
dence a strong presumption generally accorded to conflicting state
257 Specifically, minority rule courts refuse to consider state consensual surveillance
standards as part of the federal standards applicable in federal court.
258 See supra notes 202-33 and accompanying text.
259 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch,J.,
dissenting) ("I discern no conflict between the [state and federal] ... statutes .... To the
contrary, I suggest that Congress sought to incorporate into Title III state-imposed limi-
tations on the conduct of state officers ....").
260 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963)(quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))("The settled mandate governing
this inquiry, in deference to the fact that a state regulation of this kind is an exercise of
the 'historic police powers of the States,' is not to decree such a federal displacement,
'unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress .
261 Florida Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142.
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statutes. In cases involving concurrent state and federal statutes,
the Court has traditionally ruled in favor of statutory coexistence
absent a clear manifestation of congressional intent to the contrary.
Regardless of how close one feels the analogy with the federal pre-
emption cases is, the adoption of the minority rule requires the col-
lateral adoption of a presumption against statutory coexistence.
The minority rule's interpretation of the consensual provision
would limit state exclusionary rules in a significant and possibly fatal
way.262 Moreover, this interpretation runs counter to a plausible in-
terpretation of the provision that makes an "actual conflict" impos-
sible. As the following section shows, the minority rule's consensual
distinction may raise direct, not analogous, federal preemption
problems when a court adopts its legislative model argument.
2. The Minority Rule's Consensual Distinction under the Federal
Preemption and Di Re Doctrines
The previous section considered the consensual provision as
analogous to a federal preemption question and showed how con-
current state regulation is generally given a high presumption of va-
lidity by the Court. This section looks at the implications of
ignoring this presumption and the earlier statutory, legislative, and
historical support in favor of the minority rule's consensual distinc-
tion. Assuming all of the preceding material is unconvincing, the
alternative solution presented by the minority rule courts must be
examined carefully. Under any such examination, it becomes clear
that the adoption of the minority rule's consensual distinction is un-
tenable under current Supreme Court doctrines.
The minority rule's consensual distinction is based on a critical
interpretation of the function of subsection 2511(2)(c) in title III's
regulatory scheme as a legislative model function. This means that
the subsection was a limit of the Act's scope and not just another
federal standard. 26 3 A number of courts have stated that the subsec-
tion essentially divorces title III from consensual surveillance en-
tirely, thus making the Act a regulation of nonconsensual
surveillance alone.264 Most courts, however, do not define precisely
how they are using subsection 2511(2)(c). Although the possibility
that the consensual provision is just another federal standard sub-
262 Hall, 543 F.2d at 1240 (Koelsch, J., dissenting)(to admit evidence excluded by
state courts "is to find in Title III a congressional intent to encourage state officers to
break faith with the state and its citizens and violate clearly expressed state policy.").
263 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
264 See, e.g., United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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ject to more stringent state standards has been clearly ruled out,
minority rule courts leave its specific function within the Act largely
unexplained. 265
There are two possible ways that subsection 2511(2) (c) can be
used under the legislative model approach. First, the consensual
provision can be viewed as essentially legitimating all warrantless
consensual surveillance. Thus, minority rule courts could argue
that Congress intended title III to deal with consensual surveillance
but only to affirmatively make all warrantless consensual surveil-
lance lawful under the Act. Second, the consensual provision could
be viewed, as is the case with a number of courts, as limiting the
scope of the Act and as manifesting a congressional intent to limit
the Act's provision only to nonconsensual surveillance. 266 Thus, the
consensual surveillance portion could be read as essentially stating
that "nothing in this Act applies to consensual surveillance."
The following sections deal with both of these possibilities and
take them to their logical conclusions. It will be shown that both
alternative bases for the legislative model approach run afoul of
either the federal preemption doctrine or the other Supreme Court
doctrines. Even if the foregoing statutory and legislative historical
arguments for extending the minority rule are not conclusive, the
minority rule's consensual distinction does not present a plausible
alternative interpretation of subsection 2511(2)(c) that would war-
rant exclusion from the minority rule.
i. Subsection 2511(2)(c) as a Legitimation of Consensual
Surveillance
In enacting title III, it can be argued that Congress intended to
regulate both consensual and nonconsensual electronic surveil-
lance. The consensual side of the Act, however, was intended to be
brief but to the point. Subsection 2511(2)(c), under this approach,
was meant to legitimate all warrantless consensual surveillance and
affirmatively endorse its use by federal and state agents. 267 The
consensual provision, therefore, becomes a critical qualification of
the area susceptible to more stringent state standards allowing such
standards in the nonconsensual area while preserving all consensual
surveillance from any state regulation.
Placed in the federal preemption context, the legitimation argu-
265 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
266 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
267 While courts are almost uniformly silent on the basis for the consensual distinc-
tion, those few courts that have given reasons for the distinction seem to favor a limita-
tion rather than a legitimation rationale. See infra notes 273-87 and accompanying text.
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ment suggests that, in enacting title III, Congress occupied the en-
tire field of electronic surveillance and thereby displaced all state
regulations. Then, through its incorporation provisions, Congress
returned to the states the authority to legislate in the field so long as
their resulting regulations were as stringent as the federal regula-
tions.268 However, Congress limited this authorization in subsec-
tion 2511(2)(c) by barring states from making warrantless
consensual surveillance unlawful. Thus, Congress chose to return
regulatory control over some, but not all, uses of electronic
surveillance.
Viewed as a legitimation of consensual surveillance, therefore,
subsection 2511(2)(c) works to limit the area within which states can
legislate under the Act. This is different from the other interpreta-
tion of the consensual distinction which views subsection 2511(2)(c)
as a limitation on the scope of the Act itself. Under the legitimation
approach, the consensual provision amounts to a congressional re-
tention of the area of consensual surveillance from state legislation.
The legitimation notion, however, leads courts into a difficult
federal preemption problem. If Congress sought to retain full con-
trol over consensual surveillance by insulating consensual surveil-
lance from more stringent state standards, then it is not clear where
states get the authority to pass "all-party" consent laws in the first
place. The only authority for states to legislate in the area of elec-
tronic surveillance is title III. Thus, if Congress restricts a state's
regulatory authority to nonconsensual surveillance alone, then Con-
gress has continued to occupy the entire field of consensual
surveillance.
Under the Head test, in order for there to be coexisting concur-
rent federal and state regulations, there must be no evidence of "a
congressional design to preempt the entire field." 269 Title III was
intended as a single, unitary national regulation of the entire field of
electronic surveillance.270 In enacting the Act, Congress essentially
occupied the entire field of electronic surveillance and then re-
turned parts of the field to limited state control. Yet, viewed from
the legitimation approach, Congress placed consensual surveillance
outside the provisions of the Act so as to insure warrantless consen-
sual surveillance on both the state and federal levels. If this were
268 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 98, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
Nnws at 2187.
269 Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963)(quoting Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)).




the case, however, Congress affirmatively retained control over
consensual surveillance and thus continued to occupy the field of
consensual surveillance.
If Congress did retain exclusive control over consensual sur-
veillance, then states have no authority to pass "all-party" rules or,
for that matter, any consensual surveillance provision.271 This au-
thority only comes from title III which, under the legitimation ap-
proach, was meant to legitimate all consensual surveillance by
placing it outside of the Act's provisions, including those provisions
authorizing state standards.
The legitimation interpretation of the minority rule's consen-
sual distinction would, therefore, raise federal preemption
problems. Federal courts adopting this view of the function of sub-
section 2511 (2)(c) should not be concerned with whether, like state
nonconsensual standards, state consensual standards are applicable
in federal court. Rather, federal courts should ask where the states
get the authority to pass any state consensual standards. If Congress
sought to legitimate warrantless consensual surveillance and sepa-
rate it from the Act's provisions, then Congress never authorized
state consensual regulation. Thus, the field of consensual surveil-
lance remains in the exclusive control of the federal government,
and any state consensual standards would be preempted in both state
and federal court. 272
ii. Subsection 2511(2)(c) as a Limitation on the Entire Act
If the basis for the minority rule's consensual distinction is not
the interpretation of subsection 2511(2)(c) as a legitimation of all
warrantless consensual surveillance, then the subsection must be
read as a limitation on the Act itself. Thus, rather than legalizing all
warrantless consensual surveillance by preempting all state consen-
sual laws, subsection 2511(2) (c) can be viewed as limiting the entire
Act solely to nonconsensual surveillance by expressly removing war-
rantless consensual surveillance from the Act.273 As will be shown,
271 This is not to suggest that federal preemption of state consensual laws would be
without controversy. Certainly, these cases present a circumstance far afield from tradi-
tional federal preemption cases involving concurrent economic or environmental regu-
lation. By prohibiting any more stringent consensual state standards, Congress would
be taking a highly invasive role in state police functions. Nevertheless, while strong
arguments against federal preemption could be made, the Supreme Court has broadly
intercepted Congress' constitutional powers over areas of traditional state functions.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
272 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1956).
273 See, e.g., United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
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however, this interpretation also leads minority rule courts into seri-
ous logical problems.
Earlier in this Article, it was shown that only a few minority rule
courts have attempted to explain their basis for distinguishing be-
tween consensual and nonconsensual surveillance. 274 Thus, it is not
clear in many of these cases whether the legislative model approach
is based on the notion of the consensual provision as either a legiti-
mation of consensual surveillance or as a limitation on the Act.27 5
In United States v. Gervasi, however, the court expressly adopted
the limitation notion of subsection 2511(2)(c) as the basis of the
consensual distinction.276 After recognizing that more stringent
state standards are applicable in federal courts in cases involving
state-derived nonconsensual evidence, the court refused to suppress
the illegally gathered state consensual evidence.277 The Gervasi
court stated that "[t]his is a statutory protection afforded by Con-
gress to those who come within the terms of the statute. Title III is
addressed to the interception of wire or oral communications where
there has not been one-party consent." 278 Thus, the court con-
strued subsection 2511(2)(c) as codifying the Act's provisions to
nonconsensual surveillance alone and entirely divorced from the
area of consensual surveillance.
The limitation interpretation presents the inverse of the legiti-
mation problem. Rather than facing the preemption problems of a
field entirely occupied by federal regulation, the minority rule
courts adopting the limitation interpretation must decide consen-
sual cases in the absence of any applicable federal statute. Under
this approach, title III is a regulation of only nonconsensual surveil-
lance, which, in turn, means that Congress has never passed a regu-
lation of consensual surveillance. Presented with evidence gathered
unlawfully under a state "all-party" consent law, therefore, a federal
court must choose between following the state law or simply intro-
ducing the evidence in the absence of any federal law to the
contrary.
In United States v. Keen, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit faced this question in determining the admissibil-
v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243, 1266 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp.
632, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
274 See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
275 See e.g., McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243; cf. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1435
(9th Cir. 1984)(majority rule court).





ity of evidence gathered unlawfully by state officers under Washing-
ton's "all-party" consent law. 279 The federal prosecutors in Keen
argued that the state law was entirely irrelevant in federal court be-
cause subsection 2511(2) (c) expressly allows warrantless consensual
surveillance.280 Adopting a limitation interpretation of the provi-
sion, the court disagreed with the government's legitimation notion
of the consensual provision. "Section 2511(2)(c)," the Keen court
argued, "is worded as an exception to that section's general prohibi-
tion ofjudicially non-authorized wire taps, not as a positive authori-
zation of such taps." 28 1 However, the court also correctly noted that
interpreting subsection 2511(2)(c) as a limitation on the Act does
not solve the question of admissibility. By construing the consen-
sual provision in this way, the court noted, title III is interpreted as
simply leaving all prior state consensual laws intact.28 2 "It is not
clear, therefore, that Congress showed an intention to displace
more rigorous requirements found in state laws." 28 3
Although the Keen court ultimately upheld the admission of the
unlawfully gathered consensual evidence on other grounds,28 4 the
legitimate role of a federal court in such cases is unclear. Neverthe-
less, there is precedent for applying state law in federal court in the
absence of an applicable federal statute. The Supreme Court, for
example, has repeatedly upheld the application of state law to deter-
mine the validity of warrantless arrests made by state officers in situ-
ations in which there is no applicable federal law. In United States v.
Di Re, the Supreme Court considered this issue in a case involving a
warrantless arrest conducted by state agents in violation of New
York law.28 5 In defending the validity of the defendant's arrest, fed-
eral prosecutors argued that "an arrest without a warrant for a fed-
eral crime is a matter of federal law to be determined by a uniform
rule applicable in all federal courts." 28 6 The Court, however, ruled
in favor of applying the state law and invalidated the arrest. "[I]n
the absence of an applicable federal statute," the Court stated, "the
law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place deter-
279 508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974)(majority rule court). See also United States v. Proctor,
526 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (D. Haw. 1981).




284 Id. at 989 ("Where no constitutional right has been abused, the admissibility.., is
governed by common law principles, not by local statutes.").
285 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
286 Id. at 589.
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mines its validity." 287
The Di Re doctrine establishes a two-part test for determining
the validity of warrantless state arrests in the absence of a control-
ling federal statute.28 8 First, the arrest must be valid under the ap-
plicable state law. Second, the arrest must also comply with federal
constitutional standards.
Courts sometimes invoke the Di Re test in cases like United States
v. Hall,2 89 in which state officers used illegally obtained surveillance
evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause.290 In Hall, after
arresting the defendant and seizing evidence, state police trans-
ferred the entire case to federal court. In dissenting from the Ninth
Circuit's majority rule decision in Hall, Judge Koelsch strongly en-
dorsed the use of Di Re in such probable cause cases. 29 1 Judge
Koelsch argued that allowing state agents to use prohibited surveil-
lance evidence to reach probable cause eviscerates a state's author-
ity both to pass more stringent state laws and to control its own
police officials. Without the state agents' violation of the state law,
probable cause would never have been shown.292 "This is what Di
Re is about... ."Judge Koelsch stated, and "[i]f Title III were not
controlling as 'an applicable federal statute,' the challenged evi-
dence would be subject to suppression under the federal common
law rule of Di Re."' 293
Regardless of how persuasive a court finds Judge Koelsch's ar-
gument, Di Re clearly offers a close analogy to the present circum-
stances that supports the application of state standards in federal
court. Simply following the Di Re doctrine by analogy, a federal
court interpreting subsection 2511(2) (c) as a limitation on the Act
would still apply state consensual standards. Yet, the Di Re doctrine
is not the only authority that would support this result.
While the Supreme Court has required the application of state
laws in federal cases under Di Re, it has also required the application
of federal law in state court.294 In Rea v. United States, a federal court
287 Id.
288 Id. at 589-90.
289 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976).
290 Id. at 1245 (Koelsch, J., dissenting). See also Theis, Choice of Law and the Administra-
tion of the Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Cases, 44 TENN. L. Rav. 1043, 1066 (1977)(discuss-
ing Di Re in the title III context).
291 Hall, 543 F.2d at 1245-46 (Koelsch, J., dissenting).
292 Id. at 1246.
293 Id.
294 This Article does not argue the Di Re or Rea are directly applicable in these con-
sensual cases but that these doctrines offer close analogies that courts can look to in the
absence of clear statutory language.
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suppressed evidence in a narcotics case that was derived from an
unlawful warrant.29 5 After the evidence was suppressed, the case
was introduced in state court, where the testimony of a federal agent
constituted most of the prosecution's case. 296 The Supreme Court
ruled that the federal agent could not testify, even though the war-
rant used by the agent would have met the lower state standards.29 7
The Court specifically dismissed arguments that, since the warrant
would have been lawful under the state law, the federal agent should
be allowed to testify in state court under the lower state standard.
The Court rejected this logic, arguing that "[t]he fact that [the
agent's] ... violation may be condoned ... has no relevancy to our
problem .... [These warrant procedures] are designed to protect
the privacy of the citizen, unless the strict standards set for searches
and seizures are satisfied." 298
The Rea decision offers another aspect of the Court's tradi-
tional application of federal or state standards outside of their re-
spective forums. In Rea, the Court stressed the importance of
deterring police abuse and maintaining the accountability of police
officials to the laws that govern them.299 There is little doubt, the
Court concluded, that privacy policies will be "defeated if the fed-
eral agent can flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either
in federal or state proceedings."3 0 0
The concern for deterring police abuse was also central to the
Supreme Court's decision in Elkins v. United States.301 In that case,
295 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
296 Id. at 220.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 217-18.
299 But cf. United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(Rea not applica-
ble because evidence in title III cases was gathered in compliance with federal law.).
300 Rea, 350 U.S. at 218.
301 364 U.S. 206 (1960). It has been asserted that the majority rule undermines the
dual rationales of Elkins, which are judicial integrity and deterrence. Title III and Admissi-
bility, supra note 19, at 1741-43. In Elkins, the Supreme Court struck down the "Silver
Platter Doctrine." 364 U.S. at 222. Under that doctrine, the Court had previously held
that "[I]t is not a search by a federal officer [for fourth amendment purposes] if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter."
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949). The analogy between Lustig and
Elkins has previously been stressed:
In Elkins, the Court based its rejection of the "silver platter" doctrine on the exclu-
sionary rule's objectives of preserving judicial integrity and deterring improper po-
lice conduct. The Court emphasized the danger of turning the federal judiciary into
an accomplice that helps state officers perpetrate unconstitutional acts in frustration
of state policies. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule, in the Court's view, deters
state and federal officers from engaging in collusion and subterfuge in order to
qualify evidence that otherwise would be admissible .... Certainly, little difference
can be discerned between the dangers posed by the "silver platter" doctrine and
those posed by the majority rule. Although based on state statutory rather than
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the Court ruled that evidence gathered by state officers is inadmissi-
ble in federal court if the evidence was obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. 30 2 The Court based its exclusionary rule on two
rationales: the need to deter police abuse and the need to preserve
judicial integrity.30 3 These rationales, the Court argued, are equally
important in the title III area.30 4 Although statutory, not constitu-
tional, rights are involved in such a situation, the circumvention of
state privacy rights by state agents undermines the very authority of
the states to control derelict officers and to afford their citizens
greater privacy protections than those provided by the federal
government. 30 5
These rationales have been applied to title III cases in support
of the application of state privacy protections.30 6 Although Elkins
involved fourth amendment rights, the threat to judicial integrity
and need for deterrence of police abuse is equally great in the title
III context.30 7 A Pennsylvania state judge, after chronicling the re-
constitutional violations, the majority rule's promise of unrestrained forum shop-
ping is no less real, its concomitant threat to judicial integrity no less keen.
Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1742-43.
302 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223.
303 Id. at 224.
304 Id. at 223. Justice Brandeis stressed the danger of allowing state agents to use the
federal system to circumvent their own courts:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Id. at 223 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
305 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1747.
306 Id. See United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The
Eyerman court stated:
Where a state has demonstrated its emphasis on privacy in enacting a stringent
wiretap statute, it would ill serve the concerns of federalism for a federal court to
allow state officials to flaunt that law by making cases in federal court with evidence
that their state legislature has deemed tainted.
Id. See also State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 883, 700 P.2d 711, 727 (1985)(Dore, J.,
dissenting)("Policy arguments rooted in deterrence and maintaining judicial integrity
... have great validity [in cases of illegally gathered consensual evidence].").
307 Concerns for individual privacy and deterrence were recently shown to be equally
important in cases where the federal prosecutors seek to introduce evidence derived
from an illegal private surveillance. See United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (Ist Cir.
1987). In this case, Jesse James Waters, a suspect in the shooting of a police officer,
illegally recorded the bribing of two other police officers. The government sought to
admit the tapes at the trial of one of the officers, arguing that "it would be pointless to
apply [the Act's exclusionary rule] ... where ... the government is the innocent recipi-
ent, rather than the guilty interceptor, of an illegally-intercepted communication." Id. at
480. The First Circuit rejected this argument, holding that to read title III as allowing
"the government's use of unlawfully intercepted communications where the government
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peated and open circumvention of state courts by state officers, ar-
gued strongly in favor of extending the Elkins holding to such
cases.30 8 The judge warned that "[i]f a federal court sitting within
the same city ... admits evidence seized by state police, which pa-
tently violates state law, the court becomes a potential depository
for sordid police activities. '3 0 9 A Washington state judge argued
and objected that "court[s] should not condone ... [the] incentive
to circumvent . . . [state law] by subterfuge and evasion of state-
guaranteed privacy interests." 310 Federal judges have reacted simi-
larly and have invoked Elkins, in concert with statutory support, in
favor of applying state law.3 1 1 The analogy of Elkins to nonconsen-
was not the procurer would eviscerate the statutory protection of privacy from intrusion
by illegal private interception.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899,
914-15 (D. Mass. 1986), aft'd, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987).
This logic is readily applicable to a case involving illegally gathered state evidence,
whether nonconsensual or consensual. Yet, although some district courts have appar-
ently embraced the minority rule, the First Circuit has not expressly endorsed the mi-
nority rule. See supra note 145. While the evidence in Vest was gathered below the
federal standard (unlike most of the cases in this Article), the loss of privacy protections
are no less severe when federal prosecutors are the "innocent recipients" of evidence
gathered illegally by state agents.
308 Ziegler, Constitutional Rights of the Accused-Developing Dichotomy Between Federal and
State Law, 48 PENN. B.A.. 241 (1977). In this article, Judge Zeigler considered what he
called the "copper platter doctrine," which is the circumvention of state privacy rights
by state agents through the use of the federal courts. "In practice, we are witnessing a
resurrection of problems not unsimilar from those which were countenanced in Lustig
and condemned in Elkins." Id. at 252-53. Cf. State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d at 883-84,
700 P.2d at 727-28 (Dore, J., dissenting)(rejecting "new version of the silver platter
doctrine' " in which federal agents gather evidence below state standards and then hand
over the evidence to state counterparts for use in state court).
309 Ziegler, supra note 308, at 252-53.
310 State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d at 884, 700 P.2d at 728 (Dore, J., dissenting).
O'Neill involved what is sometimes referred to as a "reverse silver platter" problem,
where federal agents collect surveillance evidence under the lower federal standards and
then hand over the evidence for use in state prosecutions.
3 11 Id. One federal judge, considering both the Di Re and Elkins arguments, stated:
I see no inconsistency between Di Re . . .and Elkins, which held "that evidence
obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers,
would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's timely
objection in a federal criminal trial." (citation omitted) It would appear that Elkins
dictum concerns the second prong of the Di Re test, i.e., whether federal constitu-
tional standards were violated by the state officers. Notably, the circuits which de-
part from this court's interpretation of Di Re seem to reason that Elkins somehow
"vitiated" the holding of Di Re ... However, United States v. Watson, (citation
omitted) and Ker v. California, (citation omitted) strongly suggest otherwise.
United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1245 n.15 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch, J., dissenting).
See also United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1226 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second
Circuit in Sotomayor stated:
Since a state's protection reflects principles central to its social and governmental
order, our failure to respect its more stringent protection of privacy rights would
not violate principles of federalism, but encourage state and federal law enforce-
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sual surveillance cases has been advanced, but the relevance of the
argument is equally relevant in the consensual area:
[s]ince state court efforts to deter police violations of state law appear
as unsuccessful as their earlier attempts to deter state officers' fourth
amendment violations, the only effective deterrent for this type of fo-
rum shopping is to deny the admission in federal court of all illegally
gathered state surveillance evidence. The majority rule court's blatant
evasion of state law denigrates the judicial integrity of federal courts
no less than the "silver platter" doctrine struck down in Elkins. If the
judicial integrity imperative of Elkins has any contemporary vitality,
federal courts must refuse to admit illegally gathered state evidence
laundered through federal prosecutors. But suppression must be
without exception. So long as forum shopping is even marginally pref-
erable to compliance with state law, evasion of state law will continue.
State and federal officers seeking a conviction will gravitate to the fo-
rum of least resistance. 312
The dual rationales of Elkins are further evidence of the Court's
past preference in favor of applying state law when privacy interests
and the deterrence of police abuse are involved.313 As with Rea, El-
kins was based in large part on the observation that, without the ex-
clusionary rule, the circumvention of privacy rights would
continue.3 14 This danger is particularly acute in the area of consen-
sual surveillance in which states are viewed as having little success in
ment to by-pass state law and to engage in federal forum-shopping of tainted
evidence.
Id. at 1225. Cf. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 250 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)("[i]t seems to me
unseemly for a federal court not to respect the determination of a state court that its
own officials were guilty of wrongdoing .... "); United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d
662, 665 (9th Cir. 1983)(per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1218 (1984)(stating in dictum
in a nonsurveillance case that "[t]here is much to be said for the argument that federal
courts should, in the interest of comity, defer to a state's more stringent exclusionary
rule with respect to evidence secured without federal involvement.").
312 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1747.
313 See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1968)("We conclude.., that nothing
short of mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence will compel respect for the federal
law 'in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.' ")(quoting, Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217).
314 Some courts strongly reject the deterrence argument in applying state standards
in federal court. See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1372 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976)("If the states could require federal courts to exclude
evidence in federal criminal cases, some convictions would undoubtedly be lost, and the
enforcement of congressional policy would be weakened."). In United States v. Rickus,
737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit, in a nonsurveillance case, rejected
the deterrent argument after considering minority rule cases by analogy. The court rea-
soned that "sanctions already exist to control the state officer's conduct. He is pun-
ished' by the exclusion of evidence in the state criminal trial .... " Id. See also United
States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987)(rejecting applicability of Elkins
policies in a nonsurveillance case since "[a] state prosecutor whose case relies on evi-
dence that may be inadmissible in a state court trial has no power or authority to effect a
prosecution in federal court.").
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curbing abuses. 315 The Court has traditionally deterred police
abuse by guaranteeing that the police would not derive any practical
benefit from violating the law. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, the Court noted: "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be
used at all." 31 6
The import of decisions like Di Re, Rea, and Elkins offers strong
support for applying state consensual standards in federal surveil-
lance cases. Minority rule courts that readily embrace the limitation
argument as a basis for the consensual distinction must consider the
consequences carefully. It is far from clear that the simple argu-
ment that subsection 2511(2)(c) affirmatively limits the Act to non-
consensual surveillance will defeat a suppression motion based on a
state "all-party" consent rule.3 17
The amenability of the limitation interpretation to the applica-
tion of state standards, however, is not meant to suggest that the
limitation interpretation is a solid one. Both the legitimation and
limitation interpretations neglect a number of compelling argu-
ments against the use of a consensual distinction. Yet, even putting
these arguments aside, either basis for the distinction is difficult to
maintain in the manner that the minority rule courts have used
them. Either minority rule courts run afoul of the federal preemp-
tion test, or they unjustifiably ignore state law in the absence of an
applicable federal statute. The result is a theoretical and practical
morass that can be avoided by the simple extension of the argument
used by minority rule courts in their rejection of the majority rule.
Legislative action to resolve the increasing questions concern-
ing the Act's language is long overdue. The following section sug-
gests some statutory changes that would amend title III to more
clearly require the application of more stringent state standards-
consensual or nonconsensual-in federal court.
V. CODIFYING THE FEDERAL REGULATORY INTERPRETATION: A
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The minority rule's consensual distinction is generally based,
either explicitly or implicitly, on an interpretation of subsection
315 It was recently suggested that Congress consider repealing the electronic surveil-
lance authority of states "because the state courts seem to be performing the worst job
of enforcing the statutory safeguards... HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at
55.
316 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
317 See Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1736 n.162.
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2511(2)(c) as performing a legislative model function. Rather than
viewing the provision as just another federal standard subject to
more stringent state law, minority rule courts view it as shaping the
legislative model that was to serve as a template for future state sur-
veillance statutes. Regardless of whether a court views the provision
as legitimating all warrantless surveillance or as limiting the Act it-
self, the result of the legislative model approach is the same: the
restriction of state authority solely to the enactment of nonconsen-
sual surveillance statutes.
The extension of the minority rule to include consensual sur-
veillance can be easily accomplished through a more careful reading
of the Act and its legislative history. However, withstanding such a
change in the various circuits, the time is ripe for legislative action
to clarify the statute and the role states are to play under it.18 s Re-
markably, Congress substantially revised the Act recently and en-
tirely ignored both the rift between the majority and minority rule
circuits as well as the problems regarding more stringent state con-
sensual laws.3 19
The product of over two years of congressional hearings and
study, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986320 radi-
cally expanded both the breadth and the bite of the eighteen-year-
old statute to fit a different technological and regulatory era. Origi-
nally enacted to control the interception of telephone conversa-
tions, title III was rewritten to extend beyond the confines of simply
aural communications in order to encompass such nonaural varia-
318 A legislative solution to the problem is particularly appealing given the rather dis-
mal record of courts in this area. One recent government report on electronic surveil-
lance saves some of its harshest criticism for the courts:
[The courts, on their own, and relying solely on constitutional principles and con-
cepts, have neither the will nor the capacity to respond imaginatively and effectively
to the new technologies. Only the legislature, often afterjudicial fumbling and fail-
ure, can adopt the measures that go some way toward reconciling the conflicting
and varying needs .... The courts-which, in this context, means the Supreme
Court-continually tries [sic] to pour the new wine of technology and technique
into the old conceptual bottles but it doesn't do it successfully, and it becomes the
job of the legislature to clean up the mess.
HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 2.
319 Recently, the 99th Congress comprehensively amended title III in an effort to
bring the Act's provisions up to date with contemporary technological advances in elec-
tronic surveillance. See generally Electronic Communication Privacy Act: Hearings on H.R.
3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1986). See also, 132 CONG. REC. S8000
(daily ed. June 19, 1986)(statement of Sen. Mathias)("This legislation responds to [re-
cent technological] developments by protecting the privacy of information in any elec-
tronic form, while it is in transmission or temporary storage, and without regard to the
medium of its transmission.").
320 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986)(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (Supp. IV 1986)).
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tions as textual, digital, and machine communications. 32'
The final changes enacted by Congress are sweeping. Title III
now includes: a definition of all electronic communications, includ-
ing voice transmissions;3 22 a rule that all interceptions of computer
systems require court warrants;323 and a rule that the protection
given to common carrier telephone systems would be extended to
all electronic communications not intentionally designed to be ac-
cessible to the public. 324 As important as these changes were, how-
ever, the Act's final language was disappointing because of its
failure to consider more general, nontechnologically related ques-
tions in title III. Foremost among these are questions over the gen-
eral applicability of more stringent state standards in federal court
and, if state standards are generally applicable, the specific applica-
bility of more stringent state consensual standards.
A. THE INCORPORATION PROVISIONS: REINFORCING THE
APPLICATION OF MORE STRINGENT STATE STANDARDS IN
FEDERAL COURT
Before rectifying the current confusion over the consensual dis-
tinction, Congress must first clarify the general incorporation of
state standards into the standards applied in federal court.32 5 In
cases involving unlawfully gathered state surveillance evidence,
more stringent state standards should govern the admissibility of
the evidence in federal court. Although the minority rule courts do
not recognize the incorporation of more stringent state consensual
standards, they muster a considerable amount of statutory and his-
torical support in favor of applying state nonconsensual stan-
dards.3 26 The first series of amendments, therefore, must be to
321 Id. See also 132 CONG. REC. 44045 (daily ed. June 23, 1986)(statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier)("The Electronic Communication Privacy Act updates [title III] ... to take
into account new forms of electronic communications such as electronic mail, cellular
telephones, and data transmissions.").
322 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Supp. IV 1986).
323 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. IV 1986).
324 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. IV 1986).
325 A recent government report went so far as to suggest that it might be time to
consider repealing state surveillance statutes altogether. HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW,
supra note 4, at 55. The Historical Policy Review, written by Herman Schwartz, states:
[A] case can be made for the proposition that because state use is primarily for
gambling and relatively minor narcotics enforcement, and because the state courts
seem to be performing the worst job of enforcing the statutory safeguards, there is
little to lose and much to gain from such a proposal. A more limited . . . option
would entail reducing the crimes for which state officials may use electronic surveil-
lance, by limiting them to serious felonies like murder or kidnapping.
Id. at 55-56.
326 See, e.g., United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472
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those provisions misconstrued by majority rule courts. 327 After
strengthening the minority rule, Congress can then amend subsec-
tion 2511(2)(c) to insure the extension of the minority rule in con-
sensual surveillance cases.
Three of the Act's eleven sections are viewed as critical to the
admission or exclusion of state standards in federal court. The first
provision is section 2515, which prohibits the use of surveillance ev-
idence "if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of
this chapter. '3 28 Section 2515 effectively bars the use of the fruits
of illegally gathered surveillance evidence. It is unclear, however,
whether this provision defines a "violation of this chapter" to in-
clude violations of the state laws enacted under it.329 One way of
clarifying this language would be to modify section 2517, the provi-
sion governing lawful disclosure under the Act, to expressly incor-
porate state standards. In the absence of, or in addition to, such a
change to section 2517, however, section 2515 can be amended in
the following way to require the incorporation of state standards in
using state-derived evidence:330
[wjhenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a state, or a political subdivision thereof if the dis-
closure of that information would be in violation of any state or federal
standard contained or enacted pursuant to this chapter.3 3 1
The second provision often discussed by majority and minority
rule courts is section 2517.332 As noted above, this provision con-
trols the proper disclosure and use of surveillance evidence. Sec-
tion 2517, therefore, defines a lawful disclosure for the purposes of
section 2515, which bars the disclosure of any evidence falling
outside of its definition. 333 Subsection 2517(1) governs the disclo-
sure of surveillance material by state and federal agents. Such dis-
closure is allowed only when "appropriate to the proper
performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving
U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. McNulty, 729 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir. 1984)(en banc);
United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1979).
327 See generally Title III and Admissibilty, supra note 19, at 1747-51.
328 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982).
329 Id.
330 For suggested amendments of § 2517, see infra notes 332-40 and accompanying
text.
331 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982 & Supp. 1986)(italicized portions added by Author).
332 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
333 For the language of § 2517, see supra note 139.
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the disclosure. '3 3 4 Minority rule courts have stressed that federal
courts must apply state law to determine whether a state officer's
disclosure is in fact appropriate for the proper performance of his
official duties.33 5 Majority rule courts, however, have disagreed, ar-
guing that more clear language is required before state law can dis-
place federal law.3 3 6 Subsection 2517(1), therefore, could be
amended to satisfy the majority rule's clarity requirement:
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of
any wire, oral or electronic communication, or evidence derived there-
from, may disclose such contents to another investigative or law en-
forcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to
the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or
receiving the disclosure, as provided for by the controlling state or federal
standards.33 7
Section 2517 governs the use of surveillance material by state
and federal officers.33 8 Subsection 2517(2) requires that state and
federal officers use surveillance material only in accordance with
their official duties. Once again, the absence of an express mandate
to apply the standards of the controlling state or federal law has
been given great weight by majority rule courts.33 9 The amendment
of this subsection, therefore, would parallel the modification of sub-
section 2517(1):
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of
any wire, oral or electronic communication or evidence derived there-
from may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to
the proper performance of his official duties, as provided for by the con-
trolling state or federal standards.340
The third provision often involved in majority or minority rule
opinions is section 2518.3 4 1 Subsection 2518(10)(a) is the Act's
main exclusionary rule and requires the suppression of evidence
that is unlawfully intercepted, intercepted under an invalid court or-
der, or intercepted in violation of a court order.3 42 Minority rule
courts claim that the application of more stringent state standards in
334 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
335 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1252 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch,J.,
dissenting); United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d at 1225-26 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1976).
336 See, e.g., McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1251 (Doyle, J., concurring); Hall, 543 F.2d at 1232.
337 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (Supp. IV 1986)(italicized portions added by Author).
338 Id.
339 See, e.g., McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1251 (Doyle, J., concurring); Hall, 543 F.2d at 1232.
340 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (Supp. IV 1986)(italicized portions added by Author).
341 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
342 Id. at § 2518(10)(a) (1982).
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cases of state-derived evidence is essential for determining these
threshold tests of admissibility.3 43 Majority rule courts, however, in-
sist that there is no explicit mandate to apply state law and that,
without such a mandate, the presumption must be that federal law
applies in federal court.344 Thus, majority rule courts construe pre-
requisites such as a lawful interception and valid court order as re-
quiring the standards that would have been imposed by a federal
authorizing court.3 45 The following two changes would make ex-
press what is already implied by the provision's language:
(10)(a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or
before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral com-
munication, intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived
therefrom, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted in violation of the
state or federal law governing the law enforcement officers conducting the
surveillance;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was in-
tercepted is insufficient on its face;
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval.
Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding
unless there was no opportunity to make such motion or the person
was not aware of the grounds of the motion. The legality of an intercep-
tion, court order, or execution of a court order will be determined by the law of the
state or federal jurisdiction under which the interception or court order was exe-
cuted. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated
as having been obtained in violation of this chapter.3 46
These amendments to sections 2515, 2517, and 2518 would re-
move all doubt as to the applicability of more stringent state stan-
dards in federal court. In some ways, the amendments are
redundant, particularly the amendments to sections 2515 and 2517.
The clear incorporation of state standards into the definition of a
lawful disclosure would be enough to trigger section 2515's exclu-
sionary rule without the added amendment to section 2515. More-
over, the simple enactment of any amendment for this purpose
343 McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1264 (en banc)(section 2518 requires suppression of unlaw-
fully intercepted evidence, the unlawfulness of which is defined by state law); Sotomayor,
592 F.2d at 1225-26 n.13 (section 2518(10)(a) requires lawful interception and whether
it is lawful can be determined only by reference to state law through section 2516).
344 See, e.g., McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1251 (Doyle, J., concurring) ("We conclude that Title
III is ambiguous on the question, and does not direct [sic] reference to state law.").
345 Title IIl and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1741-52.
346 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1O)(a) (1982)(italicized portions added by Author).
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would result in new legislative history supporting the Act's already
implicit incorporation of state standards.
B. SECTION 2511: EXTENDING THE MINORITY RULE TO CONSENSUAL
SURVEILLANCE
Once the Act has been amended to better support the minority
rule's incorporation of state law generally, Congress can easily
amend subsection 2511(2)(c) to guarantee the extension of the mi-
nority rule to consensual surveillance. 347 The purpose of the
amendment to the consensual provision would be to refute any no-
tion that the provision serves a legislative model function. By ad-
ding the words below, the consensual provision would state clearly
that its authorization of warrantless consensual surveillance is sim-
ply a federal standard subject to more stringent state consensual
laws.
(2) (c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communica-
tion, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such intercep-
tion, subject to the more stringent state consensual standards of a controlling state
jurisdiction.348
This amendment to the consensual provision would bring more
stringent state consensual standards under the Act's other provi-
sions, including the incorporation and suppression provisions.
While this Article takes no position on the continuation of the war-
rantless consensual federal standard, such an amendment would
guarantee the realization of Congress' policy of state experimenta-
tion in both the consensual and nonconsensual areas. Conversely,
the failure to include the amendment to subsection 2511(2)(c) with
the other amendments would implicitly adopt the consensual dis-
tinction. Before such a drastic decision is made, however, Congress
must look carefully at the suggested differences between consensual
and nonconsensual surveillance in terms of individual privacy,349
347 This assertion assumes that Congress would reject the option of eliminating the
consensual distinction entirely by banning all warrantless electronic surveillance.
Although the vast majority of prosecutors oppose this option, some prosecutors appar-
ently support such an option or at least are not "aghast at the thought of putting consen-
sual devices under court order." NWC REPORT, supra note 30, at 118 (quoting STAFF
STUDIES, STATE, ESSEX COUNTY (NEWARK), NEW JERSEY 1976).
348 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c) (Supp. IV 1986)(italicized portions added by Author).
349 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1736 n.162. It is important to note that
minority rule courts stress privacy concerns in their refusal to apply more stringent state
laws in cases involving post-interception violations. In addition to their consensual dis-
tinction, minority rule courts use the post-interception distinction to apply only state
procedures governing the interception of wiretap evidence. Id. at 1735-36 n. 161. State
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federalism, 350 and law enforcement. 351 In such an event, Congress
must also be prepared to answer the federal preemption questions
and policy questions raised in this Article. Under even a cursory
examination of the issue, Congress will find that the evidentiary
value of using illegally gathered state evidence pales in comparison
to its systemic and individual costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the statutory and historical evi-
dence supporting the minority rule's consensual distinction and the
arguments for the rule's extension. This Article has shown how the
consensual distinction evolved from Supreme Court cases and how
procedures governing the preservation of such evidence after interception are deemed
more tied to evidentiary than privacy concerns:
[there is good reason] for distinguishing between the "right of privacy" and the
"evidentiary" dimensions of wiretap regulations is [sic] provided by Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, et seq., the federal
statute governing wiretapping by federal and state authorities. In enacting Title III,
Congress specifically intended to leave the states free to adopt limitations on eaves-
dropping more stringent than those applicable to warrants issued by a federal
court.... Read as a whole Title III suggests that the reference to state law extends
only to the conditions for the issuance and execution of an eavesdropping warrant,
as distinguished from postinterception evidentiary procedures such as sealing.
Sotomayor, 592 F.2d at 1225-26 n.13. If privacy is such a determinative issue for these
courts, then the concern should be at its greatest in consensual cases in which the dan-
ger to privacy is probably more acute. It is precisely because of the heightened privacy
concerns that states passed these standards. To allow state officers to circumvent state
courts effectively eviscerates state privacy protections.
350 The states' placement of greater limitations on the conduct of their law enforce-
ment officers exemplifies the states' resumption of their traditional role in protect-
ing privacy interests. Accepting Congress' invitation to limit electronic surveillance,
described by the Court as one the the greatest threats to liberty, state legislatures
passed laws protecting their citizens' privacy to a greater extent than the protections
offered under federal law.
Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1751; see also United States v. Elkins, 364 U.S.
206, 221 (1960)("The very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance
of needless conflict between state and federal courts.").
351 It has been suggested that Congress did not deal much with consensual surveil-
lance in the Act because of its dubious use in combating organized crime. As Walinski &
Tucker, supra note 76, at 23 argue:
Congress may have ignored consent wiretaps because, unlike bugging and noncon-
sensual wiretaps, consent taps are of little value in solving that unique law enforce-
ment prolems [sic] associated with fighting organized crime. The usual methods of
law enforcement, including the use of informants and undercover work, are ineffec-
tive in fulfilling Title III's goal of combatting organized crime. Consent taps, which
require the cooperation and consent of insiders, are of little use.
Id. See also S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 13, at 74, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2161-62 (in organized crime circles, "[i]nsiders are kept quiet by an
ideology of silence underwritten by a fear, quite realistic, that death comes to him who
talks."). Conversely, it is clear that there are many incentives for state and federal of-
ficers to circumvent more stringent state privacy standards. Title III and Admissibility,
supra note 19, at 1743-45.
JONATHAN TURLEY
Congress later codified that distinction in subsection 2511(2)(c) of
title 111.352 There is no evidence, however, either in the Act's lan-
guage or legislative history that indicates that this codification re-
flected an intent by Congress to insure the continued use of
warrantless consensual surveillance on both the federal and state
levels. Nor is there any evidence of an intent to confine the opera-
tions of the Act to nonconsensual surveillance alone. Rather, sub-
section 2511(2)(c) appears to be the product of the same process
that produced the nonconsensual provisions-the simple codifica-
tion of standing Supreme Court standards for the purpose of estab-
lishing minimum federal standards subject to more stringent state
laws.
Ultimately, the disagreement over the consensual provision is
one of rivaling notions of the provision's function in the overall
scheme of the Act.353 This Article has suggested that the provision
performs a federal regulatory function that sets the standard that
must be followed by federal agents. Just as the nonconsensual fed-
eral standards were, in large part, derived from standing Supreme
Court precedent, the consensual standard was meant to be the mini-
mum standard for federal operations alone. In the consensual sur-
veillance area, the standard for federal agents-the Court's standing
precedent in the area-was the unregulated use of consensual sur-
veillance. Accordingly, like the nonconsensual standards, this stan-
dard should be subject to the more stringent consensual standards
of state laws.3 54
In order to support their consensual distinction, minority rule
courts must construe the consensual provision as serving a legisla-
tive model function.3 55 These courts must argue that the provision
affirmatively limits the incorporation provisions of the Act.
Although minority rule courts generally do not articulate precisely
how they are interpreting the provision's language, only two pos-
sibilities present themselves as bases for the legislative model ap-
proach. First, the provision can be read as being a legitimation of all
consensual surveillance activities.356 Under this view, the provision
would reflect an intent by Congress to pass a national regulation of
both consensual and nonconsensual surveillance but only permit-
ting more stringent state standards in the nonconsensual area.
However, interpreted in this manner, minority rule courts run into
352 See supra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 118-22, 202-05 and accompanying text.
354 Title III and Admissibility, supra note 19, at 1750.
355 See supra notes 116-18, 202-04 and accompanying text.
356 See supra note 267-72 and accompanying text.
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difficult federal preemption problems because if Congress never au-
thorized more stringent state consensual standards, then any more
stringent state consensual provisions might be preempted. Con-
gress would, in effect, have retained exclusive regulatory control of
the area.
The other possible basis for the consensual distinction would
be to view the provision as a limitation on the Act.3 57 That is, mi-
nority rule courts could argue that Congress intended subsection
2511(2)(c) to essentially state that "nothing in this Act applies to
warrantless consensual surveillance." However, this interpretation
also presents serious problems for minority rule courts. If the pro-
vision is a limitation on the scope of the Act, then there is no federal
statute on consensual surveillance. If there is no applicable federal
statute on consensual surveillance, however, it is not clear that a fed-
eral court can ignore the state standards and admit unlawfully gath-
ered evidence. In a number of closely analogous areas, the
Supreme Court has required the application of a state law when
there is no applicable federal statute or where there are issues of
deterrence and judicial integrity involved.358
These difficulties, however, can be avoided with the simple ex-
tension of the minority rule to the consensual area. There is a solid
base of support in the Act's statutory language and legislative his-
tory to support this extension. 59 In addition, strong policy reasons
exist for upholding state privacy protections whenever possible. Be-
cause minority rule courts have already recognized these policy ra-
tionales in their rejection of the majority rule, this Article has
concentrated on the validity of the minority rule's consensual dis-
tinction in terms of its statutory and logical support. This is not to
disregard the policy arguments previously argued by various
courts3 60 and commentators 361 for applying state law, however.
Although this Article is intended to show that the minority rule's
consensual distinction is unsupportable theoretically, it is danger-
ous to ignore the underlying privacy and federalism dangers in-
volved in superseding state protections of individual privacy. The
emphasis placed on prosecuting criminals as expeditiously as possi-
ble often neglects these countervailing considerations. At the time
357 See supra notes 273-317 and accompanying text.
358 See supra notes 285-317 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 205-33 and accompanying text.
360 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1240 (9th Cir. 1976)(Koelsch, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977); State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 865,
700 P.2d 711, 721 (1985)(Dore, J., dissenting).
361 See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 308.
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of Olmstead v. United States,362 this trade-off between privacy and
prosecutions was made in furtherance of the war against bootleg li-
quor.3 6 3 Today, the cause is more likely to be the war on drugs.364
Yet, whatever the cause, the potential costs to society remain pro-
hibitively high. As Justice Holmes eloquently stated in his dissent in
Olmstead, in these cases of cost-benefit analysis, far more important
societal interests are involved than the conviction of a single
criminal:
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that
all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the Gov-
ernment should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they
are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained.... We have to
choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.3 6 5
362 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
363 Electronic surveillance became a significant political issue during Prohibition with
"dry" congressmen advocating its use and "wet" congressmen calling for its ban. His-
TORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 8. One "wet" congressman, Representative
Tinkham, offered an amendment banning electronic surveillance entirely, a move an-
other "wet" congressman called vital to countering the "moral fanaticism that is behind
the enforcement of the eighteenth amendment .... " 74 CONG. REC. 2,902 (193 1)(state-
ment of Rep. Beck). See also HISTORICAL POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 8. The amend-
ment failed but was later passed in the post-prohibition era.
364 As with the Prohibition, the national mobilization against drugs is clearly reflected
in a shift in governmental surveillance targets. In 1974, the largest percentage (54%) of
all nonconsensual surveillance was conducted against illegal gambling targets. NWC
REPORT, supra note 30 at 267, (table F-3). In 1986, narcotics targets replaced gambling
targets as the most common crime under surveillance (43%). U.S. COURTS REPORT
(1986), supra note 8, at 10 (table 3).
365 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting). Cf. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1, 13 (1984)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(warning in a narcotics case that "[t]he single-
minded achievement of results in individual cases is not a virtue that should characterize
the work of this Court.").
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